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Foreword 
The mission of the Secretariat for Institutional Support for Economic Research in Africa 
(SISERA) is to provide technical and financial support to African research centres. One of 
SISERA's main objectives is to help improve upon the dissemination of research results of 
African centres. 
This Working Paper Series was established in order to provide an outlet for the research output 
of SISERA's Partner Institutions, which are African research centres that have demonstrated a 
capacity to carry out policy-oriented research and to help enhance the policy debate in their 
respective countries or sub-regi oris. 
The Series focuses on economic policy-making topics and provides a forum for discussions on 
issues of interest to African countries. It is widely circulated within Africa to policy-makers and 
research centres and abroad to institutions that work in the development field. 
Manuscripts of Partner Institutions are published with their authorization. 
For further information please contact: 
Secretariat for nstitutionaI Support 
for Economic Research in Africa (SISERA) 
B.P. 11007 CD Annexe 
Dakar, SENEGAL 
Tel: (221) 8240920/8244231/8243931 
Fax: (221) 825 32 55 
e-mail: dtandian @idrc.org.sn 
{M]ore than a trillion dollars roam the world every 24 hours, restlessly seeking the 
highest return 
[A]lthough private investment flows to developing countries increased between 
1970 and 1994 from $5 billion to $173 billion, three-quarters of this went to just ten countries, 
mostly in East and South-East Asia and Latin America. Countries elsewhere, particularly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, have been left behind. Human Development Report, 1996 
I Introduction 
Governments of developing countries are now giving new attention to the potential for private 
FDI in their economies. This is because many developing countries now desire to extend the 
market-price system and the private sector and to mitigate the external debt problem by attracting 
more private foreign investment. 
\XThsii ',-iit-tr, Quffc'.rc i r i-'i1irt-p rr r11cyc rnrn it ,fll ilvj rcrnfrnnt i fnrion an . J ,*t— .-."-.— —.--"--.. .—-. — — — — -—-— r
that will have to be filled with an inflow of foreign capital. In macroeconomic terms, when 
government expenditure plus private investment exceed government revenue and private savings 
(a resource gap), this internal imbalance will spill over into an external imbalance of imports 
greater than exports, and hence constitute foreign exchange gap. International financial 
intermediation is then required to fill the foreign exchange gap. This can be accomplished by 
loans from multilateral lending agencies and commercial banks, or by private foreign investment. 
While the former sources of foreign capital are flat or declining, FDI has considerable potential. 
It is understandable why there is now a desire by developing countries to increase the equity/debt 
ratio on foreign capital: There are some relative advantages of FDI over foreign loans from the 
standpoint of balance of payments adjustment. Equity investment requires payments only when 
it earns a profit, but debt requires payments irrespective of the state of the economy. The host 
country can also control payments whereas the terms of the servicing of debt are set in 
international markets. In contrast to the need to service debt (amortization and interest), earnings 
from private foreign investment are frequently reinvested and only a part repatriated. With private 
foreign direct investment, both commercial risk and the exchange rate risk are passed on to the 
investor rather than having to be borne by the host gOvernment. 
Uganda, in her attempt to accelerate growth and development, has always encouraged foreign 
direct investment through the introduction of incentive packages. This is based on the perception 
that domestic resource gap can partly be filled through foreign private investment. In other words, 
as a recipient of foreign savings, domestic resources are, therefore, supplemented. FDI makes 
available foreign exchange which should, all things being equal, increase the country's capacity 
to import. The other benefits of FDI include: 
(a) the provision of managerial knowledge and skills including organizational competence 
and access to foreign markets; 
(b) enables the transfer of technology to occur from developed economies ; and 
(c) provides an array of goods and services to residents in the recipient country. 
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There is no doubt that it is useful to encourage FDIs because the increase in real income resulting 
from the act of investment exceeds the resultant increase in the income of the investor. Once the 
value added to output by foreign capital is greater than the amount appropriated by the investor, 
social returns will exceed private returns. Given that foreign investment raises productivity and 
this increase is not completely appropriated by the investor, the greater product will be shared 
with others, and some other income groups will benefit directly. Domestic labour will benefit in 
the form of higher real wages; consumers by way of lower prices and government will receive 
higher tax revenue. These arguments do not suggest that there are no demerits to FDT. There are 
scholars who have argued that FDI leads to the domination of the domestic economy by 
foreigners; creates distortions in the domestic labour market by paying high wages, etc. Ake 
(1978). 
Before the NRM government, the Uganda government theoretically encouraged FDI but in 
practice there were series of policies that served as disincentives to FDI. For example, a 
controlled interest rate and managed exchange rate regimes as well as restricted trade policy 
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The establishment of Uganda Investment Authority in 1991 with a series of packages and 
incentives was directed at wooing foreign investors to Uganda. 
U Objectives of the study 
What is the nature and character of FDI in Uganda ? What are the effects of government policy 
(economic and non-economic) on FDT? What has been the contribution of FDI to growth and 
development in Uganda? 
Therefore, the objectives of the study are to: 
(a) Identify the main factors that motivate foreign investors to come and invest in Uganda; 
(b) Identify the salient features eg., ownership, market orientation, etc. of the investment 
initiatives being undertaken; 
(c) Assess the role and effectiveness of investment incentives in the decision making of 
investors 
(d) Examine the recent investment activities and future operational plans of the sampled 
investors 
(e) Assess the investors' opinion about government regulations and agencies; 
(f) Establish the constraints investors face in operating business in Uganda; and 
(g) Derive policy framework based on the survey findings for promoting investments in 
Uganda 
Ill Policy relevance 
It is important that appropriate policies be put in place if FDI is to contribute to economic 
development. These policies must not only be dynamic but ought to include incentives taking 
into consideration the competitive global environment. To design appropriate policies and 
strategies, policy-makers must know the limitation and prospects of the existing policy on FDI. 
The study is to assist in this direction. 
The study is to aid policy-makers to determine which sources or countries in which to target 
investors by designing specific incentives. In addition, the sectors in which to direct policies so 
as to attract the inflow of FDI will be useful to policy-makers. Invariably, Uganda must devise 
policies that will encourage a greater inflow of FDI and ensure that it makes the optimum 
contribution possible toward the achievement of the country's development goals. 
In the context of development planning, the government ought to influence the performance of 
FDI; but in carrying out this task, government should he aware of the potential contrihution of 
FDI and hence devise policies that will meet the mutual interests of private investor and the host 
country. It is in this respect that the study is policy relevant. 
IV Review of the literature 
The flow of foreign private investment or capital was the earliest type of resource transfer to 
developing economies and has been in existence before the post-war emergence of official 
development assistance (ODA) or most recent effort to transfer resources through preferences. 
FDI has two major components: Portfolio investment and direct investment. Portfolio investment 
is in the form of equity capital, either share or bond holding, in ventures in developing countries. 
On the other hand, direct foreign investment enables the foreigner to own the physical productive 
assets which he operates directly. The flow of resources is essentially carried out by large 
multinational or transnational corporations with headquarters in the developed nations; flow of 
financial capital is by private international banks. 
It is often argued that there is 'no unique established theory of foreign direct investment. Instead, 
there are various hypotheses emphasizing different macroeconomic and microeconomic factors 
that are likely to have an effect on foreign direct investment' (Khan, 1990, p. 282). Thus, there 
are several factors influencing foreign direct investment. Any effort to discuss conceptual issues 
on FDI must be aware of sweeping generalizations. 
It should be noted that the interest here is not on overall private investment but the foreign capital 
component. Thus, it is assumed that various analysis inherent in investment theorizing, also 
influences FDI. In other words, factors determining investment in general are part and parcel of 
foreign investment as well. But more importantly, is how that investment can be attracted outside 
its borders. 
There have been several studies on the relationship between government policy, private 
investment and growth in developing countries. It is important to discuss the results of some of 
these studies in relation to FDI. Monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies directed at correcting 
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unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances do affect private investment. 'The standard 
macroeconomic package oriented towards improving the balance of payments and reducing 
inflation includes restrictive fiscal and monetary policies supplemented by real devaluation' 
(Serven and Solimano, 1992, p. 100). 
The restrictive monetary and credit policies often found in stabilization packages affect 
investment in two ways: (i) They raise the real cost of bank credit; and (ii) by raising interest 
rates, they increase the opportunity costs on retained earnings. Both mechanisms raise the user 
cost of capital resulting in a reduction in investment. This effect has been confirmed by Green 
and Villanueva (1991). Other economists that found different results include: van Wijnbergen 
(1982), Blejer and Khan (1984), Lim (1987) and Dailami (1990). Their results show that in the 
repressed financial markets which characterizes most developing countries credit policy affects 
investment directly since credit is allocated to firms with access to preferential interest rate 
mechanism. However, van Wijnbergen (1983) results show that interest rates also affect firms 
that borrow in the unofficial money market. Consequently, the institutional structure of financial 
markets in developing economies is important in explaining the effect of monetary and credit 
policy on investment, and how such policy is transmitted (Montiel, 1994). 
Regarding fiscal policy, high fiscal deficits increase interest rates or reduce the availability of 
credit to private sector, or both, hence crowding out private investment. It follows that the 
reduction of public deficit during macroeconomic adjustment should allow private investment 
to expand. However, the way fiscal deficit is rectified matters. The attempt to reduce the public 
deficit often involves reduction on public investment. Yet expenditures on infrastructure like 
roads, communication networks, etc. complement private investment. Hence, curtailment of 
public expenditures on infrastructure must be carried out carefully so that private investment is 
not adversely affected especially during the adjustment process. Blejer and Khan (1984) based 
on cross-country data found that government investment in infrastructure is complementary to 
private investment while other types of government investment are not. Green and Villanueva 
(1991) and Serven and Solirnano (1991) arrived at similar results based on multi-country panel 
data. More recently, Ekpo (1994) and Asante (1994) have confirmed similar findings for Nigeria 
and Ghana using time series data. 
The influence of other macroeconomic policy variables like exchange rate (profitability, 
devaluation, etc.), irreversibility, uncertainty and the role of credibility on private investment are 
well discussed in the literature. An excellent review is in Serven and Solimano (1992). However, 
these studies have stressed private investment although the concerns raised also affect FDI. If 
domestic private investment climate is not sound and conducive, it becomes difficult to attract 
a substantial inflow of FDI. 
In economics of development, the issue of the benefits and costs of FDI causes so much 
controversy. Based on the neo-classical analysis of the determinants of economic growth, FDI 
is perceived as a way of filling in gaps between the domestically available supplies of savings, 
foreign exchange, government revenue, and management skills and the desired level of these 
resources needed to achieve growth and development targets. 
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Another role of FDI is that it fills the gap between targeted foreign exchange requirements and 
those obtained from net export earnings as well as net public foreign aid - the so called foreign 
exchange or trade gap. An inflow of FDI cannot only alleviate part or all of the deficit on the 
balance of payments current account but it can also serve to remove the deficit over time if the 
foreign-owned enterprise can generate a net positive flow of export earnings. However, in the 
case of import-substitution, the overall effect of allowing foreign investment behind protective 
tariff and quota walls is often a net worsening of both the current and capital account balances. 
Such deficits occur both from the importation of capital equipment and intermediate products and 
the outflow of foreign exchange in the form of repatriated profits, management fees, interest on 
private loans, etc. 
The other gap filled by FDI is that between targeted government tax revenues and locally raised 
taxes. By taxing profits of established foreign companies and participating financially in their 
local operations, governments are in a better position to mobilize public financial resources for 
development projects. Finally, there is the gap in management, entrepreneurship, technology, and 
skills which are assumed to be partially or completely filled by the local operations of FDI. 
The economic arguments against FDI include: 
(a) FDI may lower domestic savings and investment rates by stifling competition through 
exclusive production agreements with host governments, failing to re-invest much of their 
profits, generating domestic incomes for those groups with lower saving propensities, 
inhibiting the expansion of indigenous firms that might supply intermediate products by 
instead importing such products from overseas, and imposing high interest costs on 
capital borrowed by host governments; 
(b) in the long-run, activities of established foreign investment may reduce foreign exchange 
earnings on both current and capital accounts. The current account may deteriorate due 
to large importation of intermediate products and capital goods while the capital account 
may worsen because of profit repatriation, interest, royalties, management fees, etc; 
(c) because of the usual liberal tax concessions, excessive investment allowances, disguised 
public subsidies, and tariff protection often provided to foreign companies by 
governments, their contribution to public revenue via corporate taxes may be quite less 
than anticipated; 
(d) the dominance of EDT may adversely influence the development of indigenous 
entrepreneurship ; and 
(e) Environmental impact of FDI can be detrimental if not checked. 
Capital inflows may generate problems for an economy. Calvo, et al. (1994) suggest that 
large capital inflows often result in inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation, 
and a deterioration in the current account. According to them, the history of Latin 
America provides justification that massive capital inflows may contribute to stock 
market bubbles that could lead to an excessive expansion in domestic credit as well as 
shaking the stability of financial system. 
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There are other criticisms often levelled against the mechanism for concretizing FDI, that is, 
multinational corporations. These unfavourable arguments like charting an uneven development 
path in developing countries, producing inappropriate products, influencing host government 
policies, etc. are well examined in Todaro (1992, pp. 475-478). 
Another interesting issue on FDI is that of incentives. Government policies which include 
incentives, tax holidays, and differential tax structures can change the level of and return on FDI. 
Most countries have in place some policy measures to boost expected profits for foreign 
investors. 
Gubitz (1991) argues that distortions in source countries, like insurance on investment abroad 
could influence investors' decisions. Yet, the general investment climate and polices affecting 
particular sectors often rank above special incentives in influencing the allocation decisions of 
foreign investors. Some studies have suggested that investors for the most part ignore incentives 
particularly those that involve future benefits. Guisinger (1985) indicates that incentives play a 
minima! role in decisions on where to invest, with the attractiveness of the incentive scheme 
relative to those of other countries playing a more significant role. Invariably, countries find 
themselves in bidding wars that produce no change in a country's relative share of total capital 
inflows while increasing benefits to investors. The impact of incentives cannot be generalized; 
rather, empirical and country specific studies are needed. 
Shapiro (1990) examines the case of the automobile industry in Brazil which was established due 
to government intervention and found that the action by government was successful. It should 
be noted that government intervention may include the establishment of export-processing zones 
(EPZs) with the desire of attracting foreign investment. Wan (1987) discovers that EPZs attract 
FDI but yield uncertain economic benefits to the host country. 
Regarding tax treatment, several studies have stressed the importance of tax structure. Slemrod 
(1990) found that the influences of different tax regimes are not easy to quantify while Shah and 
Slemrod (1990) concluded that FDI flows to Mexico are sensitive to tax regimes. Tax treatment 
also affects decisions on investment, spending and type of financing. International differences 
in tax treatment affect initial foreign investment incentives as well as later decisions on research 
and development spending and product innovations. Tax laws can affect the kind of cross-border 
flows like decisions on debt-equity ratio for individual companies in a country in which the 
investment decision had already been made (Erunza and Senbert, 1981; Huizinga, 1991, 1992). 
Another interesting variable in the FDI cum growth linkage is credibility. From a policy 
perspective, the incomplete credibility of policy reforms is an important source of uncertainty. 
Unless investors view the adjustment programme as internally consistent and are convinced that 
the government will carry out despite the implied social costs, the possibility of reversal will 
become a key determinant of the investment response (Serven and Solimno, 1992, p. 108). 
Governments can reverse reform policies but private investors cannot alter decisions about fixed 
capital. It fo]lows that the value of waiting results from the losses that investors would incur if 
policies were reversed in the future. 
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The credibility factor is not a theoretical matter. In fact, many developing countries have had 
policy reversals especially during adjustment. Nigeria is a recent example when the present 
military regime reversed the policy on de-regulation and went back to a semi-controlled regime 
in November, 1993. Then from January, 1995, the regime embarked on what it labelled a 'guided 
de-regulation economy'. Such signals will not attract foreign investors because of the loss of 
confidence on how the economy is managed. Serven and Solimano (1992) have argued that a 
reversal of policy is an endogenous outcome because the private sector ultimately determines 
whether, for example, an adjustment programme can be sustained. 
There is the need to stress the importance of institutional factors in influencing EDT. Inadequate 
administration of justice, deficient property rights, incessant political intrusion in private 
business, corruption, lack of transparency and accountability as well as excessive red tapism are 
serious constraints to FDI. The government must ensure that private contracts are enforced and 
the judiciary system functions properly. Pfefferman and Madarassy (1992) argue that the quality 
of institutions in developing countries can influence EDT; strongest responses occur when 
investors are convinced that improvements in institutions will endure. They further contend that 
positive responses by investors take place in countries with an open export-oriented economy, 
a convertible currency, a large-scale privatization programme, and emergence of strong trading 
blocs which will reduce the likelihood of policy reversals by governments. 
More often, issues of credibility and policy reversals anchor on political system and its volatility 
especially in developing countries. There is the general notion that political instability will not 
only result in capitalflight but will also discourage foreign private investment. However, the 
political variable is not easy to measure or capture. Edwards (1990) utilized the degreeof 
political instability and the degree of political polarization and violence. A priori, an increase in 
both of these variables will tend to have negative effects on measures of EDT. 
The above discussion suggests that EDT is determined by the size of the market, output, capacity 
utilization, fiscal deficits, inflation, exchange rate volatility, interest rate, wages, human capital, 
institutional and political factors. 
A priori, it is expected that output, domestic interest rate,capacity utilization, credit to private 
sector, openness and public expenditures on infrastructure will have positive impact on EDT. On 
the other hand, large fiscal deficits, inflation and exchange rate distortions will discourage EDI. 
Rising capacity utilization or growing output are indicators that demand conditions are buoyant 
and that there is a need to expand productive capacity. A low level of inflation and predictive 
rates will encourage investment. However, when the general price level rises rapidly and the 
inflation rate fluctuates over time then the environment becomes unstable. Invariably, the risks 
on the returns of investment increase. In addition, high inflation results in currency devaluations 
of uncertain magnitude - this will increase the cost of imported capital goods and other inputs. 
There are not many studies on Uganda dealing with the relationship between government policy, 
EDI and growth. The present study is not only comprehensive but also timely given the dearth 
of the empirical work on the subject in Uganda. We now first examine some stylized facts on the 
investment performance in Uganda in order to better appreciate broadly the discussion on EDT. 
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V. An overview of FDI performance in Uganda 
FDI in Uganda can be discussed under four regimes, namely, the post-independence upto 1970, 
the seventies, the 1980 to 1985 and 1986 to 1996. The initial period saw increasing FDI trend, 
the second and the third, a declining and near death of FDI and the fourth, a resurrection of the 
FDI. 
The post independence period upto 1970 
Before independence, financing of development projects in Uganda came mainly from the British 
government which was the colonial authority. When the country became independent in 1962, 
the government had to look for alternative sources of funding including FDI and aid for her 
development programmes. Government attitude towards FDI was clearly demonstrated in the 
Uganda Industrial Act 1963 which put emphasis on the promotion of both foreign and local 
investors. 
Government strategy sought to promote industrialization at the expense of agriculture, viewing 
the former as having both backward and forward linkages, a potential to create market for the 
other sectors and creation of more employment. Government role in industrialization process of 
the country was enhanced by the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC) formed by the British 
in 1952. The state and a few Asian private investors like the Madhvani and Metha groups boosted 
the industrial growth of the country in the post independence era. 
The legal protection for FDI against compulsory acquisition by the state and rights to repatriate 
capital, interest and dividends was provided under the Foreign Investment (Protection) Act 1964. 
However, this did not stop the government from slowly moving towards the nationalisation of 
foreign investment in subsequent years. Towards this end, the UDC which was meant to start 
investments with big capital outlays and then sell them to private investors was given a legal right 
to control 51 percent in some of the businesses it had started and this included such projects like 
Tororo Industrial Chemicals and Fertilizers (TICAF), Uganda Cement Industries (UCI) and 
Nyanza Textiles Industries Limited (NYTIL). 
The biggest step towards nationalisation, however, came under the 1968 Common Man's Charter 
(CMC) which was viewed as a socialist stand. The economy was predominantly controlled by 
a few British-Asians who owned the commercial and industrial sectors of the country, a situation 
which government saw as unsustainable and therefore requiring change. The CMC was followed 
by the 1970 Nakivubo Pronouncement (NP) which spelt out strategies to implement the CMC. 
The NP increased government controlling interest from 51 percent to 60 percent in major private 
companies and manufacturing firms and excluded private enterprises from external trade. Foreign 
investors were not happy with this development. The business situation became tense and all 
indicators pointed towards political change. And indeed, in January 1971, the civilian 
government was overthrown by the army led by Idi Amin. 
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The Amin era: 1971 to 1979 
This period was marked by the 'Economic War' of 1972, which resulted in the expulsion of the 
British-Asians, expropriation of the assets and businesses of foreign investors mostly Asians and 
eventual collapse of the industrial and commercial sectors. 
Immediately after the coup, the military government under Idi Amin revoked the Nakivubo 
Pronouncement which provided for 60 percent share-holding and reverted to 49 percent in some 
industries. But this was followed by the Economic War which resulted into the nationalisation 
of industries and other businesses belonging to foreigners. Some businesses were given to 
Ugandans to manage while others were put under UDC and government ministries. That marked 
the beginning of more chaos to come. 
The investment climate for foreigners in Uganda during this period was quite hostile. For 
instance the problems of political instability and insecurity, nationalization, the collapse of East 
African Community, were compounded by the requirement that a foreign investor be naturalised 
as a Ugandan to do business in the country!! Failure to meet the set rules was considered 
sabotage and was liable for severe punishment which ranged from executions to deportation. So 
in effect, FDI was outlawed! The Ugandans who took over lacked capital, expertise and 
connections to continue as had the foreign investors and the commercial and industrial sectors 
virtually collapsed. 
There were shortages of almost everything which led to price hikes. The country lacked foreign 
exchange and creditworthiness. Subsequently even the military government began to realize the 
importance of EDT and tried to revive it through the 1977 Foreign Investment Decree which 
exempted a foreign investor from import duty, sales taxes on plant and machinery in investment 
in an approved enterprise. The exemptions were not retrospective and only applied if the 
investment exceeded US$ 571,000'. Investors were reluctant to risk their money at that time 
because Amin was always unpredictable and FDT continued to elude the country. The legacy of 
the military junta during this period continued to haunt the country for a long time, driving away 
potential foreign investors. 
There was also the problem of overvalued currency with an unrealistic exchange rate that 
undermined investments by inflating the cost of imported inputs, equipment and spare parts. It 
had a negative impact on investors' capital structure that included foreign hard-currency 
obligations. In the circumstances, access to foreign exchange at the official rate was strictly 
rationed. Delays and/or failures to obtain official foreign exchange in sufficient quantities had 
serious cost implications on companies. In an attempt to resolve this problem, many firms 
resorted to purchasing foreign exchange on the parallel markets, where they paid a premium over 
the rate that would be effective if a more liberalized official exchange rate regime were in place. 
1997 exchange rate was approximately US$ 8Ug.Shs. 
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The period from 1980 to 1985 
The military government was overthrown in 1979. Although an elected government came into 
power in 1980, FDI continued to elude the country, mostly on account of past expropriations of 
foreign investments. The ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital, which measures the importance of 
inward FDI to an economy, was negative 0.2 between 1981 and 1985 compared to LDCs (Africa) 
of 2.3 during the same period2. In order to correct this bad image, a bill was presented to and 
passed bythe parliament to return the properties of the foreign investors. However, it was not 
implemented till 1990 by a new government under the National Resistance Movement (NRM). 
The period from 1986 to 1996 
To reverse the downward trend in FDI inflows, the NRM government undertook steps to provide 
Uganda as an investment location. These efforts have included, at the macroeconomic level, 
wide ranging economic policy reforms such as foreign exchange rates reforms. Other measures 
haue incitided the liberalization o+ e'tstrng frmwnrk, the simplification nf administrative 
procedures applicable to foreign investors, the conclusion of bilateral investment protection and 
promotion treaties and accession to various multilateral treaties facilitating FDI flows. 
The Investment Code 1991 is the law governing investment in Uganda, which replaced earlier 
statutes relating to foreign investments, namely the Foreign Investment Decree 1977 and the 
Foreign Investment (Protection) Act 1964. However, privileges and property rights enjoyed under 
previous legislation by holders of licenses were to continue and were to be reviewed under the 
Code. 
The Investment Code 1991 provided for the creation of the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) 
to facilitate the procedures for those interested in investing in the economy. It is a one-stop-centre 
for investors. 
The broad function of UIA is to promote, facilitate and supervise investments in Uganda. 
Specifically; among others, the functions of UIA include: 
(a) to initiate and support measures which shall enhance the investment climate in Uganda 
for both Ugandan and non-Ugandan investors; 
(b) to promote investment in Uganda through effective promotional means; 
(c) granting approvals for the commencement of new businesses; 
(d) to provide and disseminate up-to-date information on incentives available to investors; 
(e) to assist incoming and existing investors by providing support services ; and 
(f) to recommend to the government national policies and programmes designed to promote 
investment in Uganda. 
In order to encourage foreign investors, a number of investment promotions have been organized 
abroad - the USA, Europe, India, Thailand, South Africa, etc. to explain the trade and investment 
opportunities available in Uganda, especially in agro-farming, fishing and forestry, minerals, 
power generation and tourism. Attractive incentives have been provided to prospective investors 
2 See World Financial and Statistical Tables 1995, 
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as well. 
A survey of actual and potential foreign investors shows that reform of regulatory and incentive 
environment has made Uganda more attractive to investors than many African countries. The 
Heritage Foundation (a research centre) of Washington DC in its December 1996 Report, 'Index 
of Economic Freedom', published in the Wall Street Journal, ranked Uganda as number 64 out 
of 150 countries.3 The ranking is based on the comparative analysis of economic freedom of a 
country in ten key areas, including: trade and taxation policy, wage and price controls, 
government consumption, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investments, banking 
policy, property rights, regulations and the black markets. 
Thus, although Africa's share of FDI flows to developing countries dropped from 11 percent in 
1986-1990 to 6 percent in 1991-1993 and down to 4 percent in 1994, the upward trend of 
investment flow into Uganda is a promising indication of the newfound confidence in a greatly 
improved political economy. 
Table 1, while failing to differentiate between local and foreign projects, exhibits the encouraging 
surge of investment emerging in Uganda. Between 1993/94 and 1994/95, private sector 
investment increased from 5.6 percent to 9.1 percent of GDP. 
Table 1: Total investment (local and foreign) in Uganda, 1991-1995 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total 
Licensed projects 12 232 351 571 554 1720 
Planned investment 
(US$mil.) 
66 505 628 563 750 2512 
Actual investment 
(US$mil.) 
25 192 239 214 285 955 
Source: UIA database for July 1991-December 1995 
Actual investment figures are taken as 38% of proposed investment. Various in-house UIA 
surveys taken in 1993, 1994 and 1995 all had proposedlactual conversion rates between 38 and 
40%. Also, breaking down the investment into years is difficult as most of the inflow is 
incremental over years and hard to trace with the somewhat unsatisfactory techniques of the UTA 
surveys. 
While the above trend is encouraging, it is essential to note the wide disparity between the 
licenses granted to proposed investments and the actual investment on ground. The UTA 
promotional literature and independent assessment of Uganda's investment climate only observe 
the planned investment figures without showing the reality of the situation on the ground. The 
average conversion rate of approximately 38% is very low in relation to other developing 
countries outside of the Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Kenya and Tanzania were ranked 75th and 89th places, respectively. 
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Factors leading to this low conversion rate include the hesitancy of investors (value of waiting)4, 
the difficulty in passing through the discouraging bureaucratic impediments before 
implementation can commerce, and the investors discovery of the difference in the rhetoric of 
the promotional agency and the reality of the business environment encountered after the initial 
license is obtained. Each perspective has validity. 
The sources of inward foreign investment coming into Uganda do not reflect the traditional 
domination of large Western multinational corporations (MNCs). Among investors looking to 
invest in East Africa, a slim 15 percent are major MNCs. Table 2 shows the sources of FDI into 
Uganda. 
Table 2: Sources of licensed inward FDI into Uganda (as of June 1995) 
Sources Number of FIll Percent of Total 
UK 293 27 
Kenya 193 18 
India 123 11 
Canada 123 11 
South Africa 9 8 
Others 332 31 
Total of African countries 277 26 
Source: UJA. Operating Summary. June 1995 
The FDI coming from UK, Canada and Kenya can be misleading. Many of these investors are 
in fact Asians forced to flee Uganda in 1972. The Uganda business sector before 1972 was 
dominated by about 70,000 Asians, most of them fled to UK, Canada and Kenya. The vast 
majority of FDI flowing into Uganda comes from firms with previous experience in Uganda or 
East Africa. 
Investment serves one of the three general purposes: to extend vertical integration, to export to 
the region, or serve the domestic market. Typically, FDI exploits the raw materials and cheap 
labour of developing countries and exports abroad. Investment flowing into Uganda with little 
exception targets the domestic market. However, this trend is slowly changing. 
The main sectors which attracted more investments during the last five years or so are: 
(a) Manufacturing (i) import substitution industries such as chemicals, cement, etc.: and 
(ii) agro processing, for example, food processing. 
UIA Survey of 1995 shows that most of the post-1991 investment is reportedly going into 
Foreign investors obtain licences et continue to wait for further proof of stability before actual implementation takes 
place. They want to secure the incentive and the right to invest but want to gain more assurance about policy 
consistency before beginning. 
Economist Associati 1994. Vol. t. p. 2. 
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the manufacturing sector, which is accounting for 70% of on-ground investment. 
Ugandan manufacturers are largely producing import substitutes. About 40% of 
manufacturing investment has been agro-based. Overall, during 1991-94, investment has 
not been directed at export oriented activities. Just about 8% of manufacturing output was 
exported to regional markets in 1995. 
(b) Agriculture, forestry and fishing - dominated by coffee and rehabilitation of tea 
plantations; other nontraditional agricultural crop exports (in raw form or with minimal 
processing), fish products, floricultural and horticultural products, etc. 
(c) Construction and services - construction and renovation of hotels mainly for tourism 
subsector grew by 18 percent per annum during 1995, earning about US$90 million from 
US$73 million in 1994. The banking and insurance industry also witnessed some 
improvement but based mainly in Kampala. 
Of the above three sectors, FDIs are concentrated mainly in manufacturing because of the 
problem with the agriculture. An obsolete, over protective law preventing foreign ownership of 
land and limited acreage of land to leased prevents FDJ from large-scale investment in Uganda. 
In addition to manufacturing, much of the foreign investment can be linked to donor-related 
projects. Unfortunately, there is not much information on the foreign projects linked to donor 
subsidies. Donor supported investment has been in projects in infrastructure such as road 
building, non-traditional exports, etc. 
VI Methodology 
The study uses both primary and secondary sources of data. Direct questioning of the investors 
to obtain insights regarding their decisions and decision making processes were undertaken. For 
instance, to gauge the foreign investors' attitudes and experiences in Uganda's investment 
environment, loan accessibility and so forth. Structured questionnaire was used to obtain the 
desired information. The study is to add importantly to the understanding of motivation and 
behaviour of foreign investors in Uganda. 
Annual time-series data for the variables of interest for the period 1975-1991 were collected from 
the following sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables (various issues); IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (various issues); Government of Uganda, Background to the Budget, and 
Key Economic Indicators (various issues); and Bank of Uganda, Annual Reports (various issues). 
Specifically, the secondary data are used for estimating the determinants and growth equations. 
VII Discussion of the survey results 
Scope of the survey 
The survey covered both local and foreign investors operational in Uganda. The survey was 
exclusively concerned with productive activities, with the explicit exclusion of purely 
commercial and consulting activities. Sectors covered by the survey include : (i) agriculture and 
related processing activities; (ii) manufacturing; (iii) construction; (iv) service activities 
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providing a direct and substantial support to productive activities (eg., transport, etc.); and 
tourism (hotels and lodges, but not restaurants and casinos). 
The survey was conducted on the basis of face-to-face interview/discussion and a structured 
questionnaire covering the following subject matters: (i) sources of interest and first contact 
points in Uganda; (ii) attitude about investment incentives; (iii) Problems in operating business 
in Uganda; (iv) recent investment activities; (v) planned future operations; and (vi) investors' 
attitudes towards government regulations and agencies. 
The questionnaires used were structured a]ong the lines of the World Bank and UTA 1994 
surveys. UTA provided a sampling frame of operational investments from which we took a 
random sample of 85 investors. Out of these, only 61 responded by providing most of the 
information required for the analysis. 
Main survey findings6 
Government efforts in attracting investors 
• Provision of an enabling investment environment by maintaining political and 
macroeconomic stability. 
• Establishment of policies and institutions which are conducive to project implementation 
and operation. The creation of investment vehicle - Uganda Investment Authority - and 
the 1991 UTA Investment Code offering security and incentives to investors in an attempt 
to offset the risk and increased cost of investing in Uganda (see Appendix B). 
• Privatization programme which is creating new opportunities for both local and foreign 
investors thus stimulating investments. According to one survey, one-third of FDI 
flowing into Uganda is related to the purchasing of state enterprises.7 
• Privatization programs act as a signal of the authority's commitment to private ownership. 
Moreover, the privatization programme with foreign participation acts as a vehicle to 
increase FDI flows with potential qualitative contributions to the economy over a longer 
period of time, since FDI flows can continue after the acquisition of an asset owing to 
post-privatization investment. Foreign investors also see it as a vehicle for fast entry into 
Uganda market and can provide profitable investment opportunities. 
• The Asian repatriation factor is another catalyst for FDI inflows. Between 1991 and 
March 1996, 1,788 properties have been repossessed and returned to their original Asian 
owners.S The returning capital to build on repatriated property must be taken into account 
when evaluating the upward trend of FDI flowing into the country. Note that this portion 
6 
Details appear in Appendix C. 
Economisti Associati. 1994, Vol. 1 p. 9. Vol. III p 24. 
S 
Department of Depailed Asian Custodian Board - 1)ivestiture Notes on Properties, March 996. 
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of investment is not likely to persist now that all the properties have been claimed by 
their previous owners. 
The dependence of PTA preferences on majority domestic ownership was revoked in 
1992. 
Perceived strengths and weaknesses of Uganda as an investment location 
• The most widely perceived strength is the overall growth prospects buttressed with 
liberalized exchange rate and a fully convertible currency, low inflation and stringent 
fiscal management. 
• However, the perception that Museveni is the key to Uganda's economic recovery and 
hence the perceived indispensability for the country's progress is viewed by foreign 
investors as a major weakness. They concede that if this is true then the future of Uganda 
will he highly uncertain if he were no longer in power. 
• The main weaknesses are: its hostile and anti-FDI history,9 landlocked position, poor 
infrastructure, high tax on fuel10, slow and high cost of utility installation and low labour 
productivity; making Uganda a high cost country. 
• The on-going conflicts especially in the North of the country erode investors' confidence 
and taint the image of the country. 
• Uganda does not have a large domestic market (poor population of only 19 million). 
Moreover, Uganda lacks access to regional market because of the high degree of 
protectionism. Yet, open boarder trade could easily wipe out our entire manufacturing 
base (Tulyamuhika 1995 report on cross boarder trade)!! 
• The banking system in Uganda is still underdeveloped, small and underdiversified 
handling essentially short term commercial transactions. Almost inaccessible sources of 
development finance for long term investments. 
Policy unpredictability 
• Although the macroeconomic policy - guided largely by the donor community - is 
predictable, the policies that have a direct impact on FDI remain erratic and thus 
constitute a serious impediment to investment facilitation. The root cause is the 
conflicting interests of the pressure groups: international donors, government agencies, 
foreign investors and politicians. 
Uganda has a history of expropriation of foreign investment and discouraging regulations. The incentive system was 
biased in favour of domestic firms. 
For example. the tax element of the fuel price in Uganda is equivalent to the pump price motorists pay in Kenya 
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One example of such policy unpredictability is the tax incentive policy since 1987. In 
1987 duty payable on all industrial raw materials was suspended. The same duty was 
reintroduced in 1990 at the rate of 10 percent. The 1991 Investment Code abolished this 
duty for inputs used by new investors to minimize start-up costs. In 1992 after foreign 
trrns negotiated agreements with the government over several tax rates, the Budget 
Speech" of 1993/94 ignored these agreements by revoking the duty exemptions on all 
industrial raw materials. In 1994, 10 percent duty was allowed for most raw materials not 
available locally. In addition, exemptions are added and revoked on an ad hoc basis by 
the Minister of Finance'2. For investors to rely on erratic policies left to the discretion of 
an individual is inconceivable. 
Tax holidays and exemptions 
• There are no incentive schemes put in place specifically for local investors, rural sector 
(agricultural, in particular) and micro and small scale enterprises that form the bulk of 
producers and processors. 
• Uganda's 1991 investment code offers tax holidays of up to 6 years from corporate profits 
taxes, dividends tax and withholding taxes on transfers to associated or parent companies 
abroad. The investment threshold for a local investor is $50,000 and for a 
foreigner-owned enterprises the minimum is $300,000. Although the thresholds differ, 
the holidays are widely perceived as henefitting mainly foreign investors. 
• The decision to grant tax holidays rests with UTA which has the power to grant or refuse 
subject to the investment code. Companies with a generous holiday may have significant 
competitive advantage over companies which do not have a holiday. This results in gross 
inequality and unfair competition. 
• Lack of transparency of this nature leads to abuse, corrupt tendencies sLich as favouritism 
towards firms with connections to people in places of authority. 
• There is no discrimination in the allocation of these incentives in terms of project 
location in the country, employment creation, or market orientation (domestic or export). 
• The tax holiday encourages enterprises which can establish and operate profitably very 
quickly. It is of limited value to a project which involves substantial investment and takes 
a long time to become profitable. Yet those are much more important from the 
economic development view point. 
• It must he noted that when a tax holiday expires it is quite easy for an investor to wind 
up and leave country or to establish under a new name to qualify for a new tax holiday. 
Thus the existing tax incentives encourage mainly short term investment as investors are 
Changes in policies are usually aunouced during annual Budget speeches. 
12 The Investment Code gives the Minister ol Finance the powers to amend the incentive scheme in an annual Budget 
Speech (see Investment Code. Pqrt ill, Section 11(4). 
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aware that their tax obligations will change after the holiday. 
• Tax holidays are insensitive to the value added a project brings to the economy. An 
enterprise which imports all its inputs (eg. bicycles, steel industry, etc.) gets the same 
benefits as one which uses primarily locally sourced inputs and therefore increases much 
more local value-added. 
• Firms which commenced operations after January 1991 enjoy 100% exemptions while 
those already in business receive less than 100%. The problems with this is that it is 
possible to get firms in the same industry getting different degrees of exemption 
resulting in unfair competition among them. 
• Tax policy appears to he ad hoc and subject to a lot of abuse. There is too much secrecy 
and apparently no objectivity in arriving at exemption tax rates which range from 0% to 
100%. On top of that, the list of exemptions - that is, corporate tax, with-holding tax, tax 
on dividends and tax on imported intermediate inputs - differ from one investor to 
another. This is at the discretion of highly placed Ministry officials. 
lnvestors primary concern 
• Foreign investors are primarily concerned with fundamental factors, that is, a stable 
macroeconomic and political situation, together with credibility of policy reforms. 
• A stable and sustainable macroeconomic environment boosts the confidence of private 
investors. Reductions in debt burden are also critical not only for sustaining both external 
and fiscal balance but also for engendering confidence to encourage private sector 
investment. 
• However, the very scale of the achievement of President Museveni invites the question 
whether the reform process is more deeply rooted politically than the person of the 
president. 
• Other factors that determine the location decision of investors are: market size (in terms 
of GDP per capita or size of the population) and market growth (GDP growth rates in 
constant prices). In addition, factors such as availability of natural resources, the quality 
of the infrastructure, and the cost. productivity and technology skills of labour are also 
taken into account. 
Salient features of investments in Uganda 
• Processing plants have been established without environmental impact assessment. 
Pollution (water, soil and air) and careless industrial waste disposal are reported to be 
rampant. 
According to NEMA, most of the plants would be closed if strict environmental standards 
were to be enforced. Key among these are fish processors. those producing batteries, 
foam mattresses, soap and detergents, paint, plastic products and oil products. 
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• Investment flowing into the country with little exception targets the domestic market - 
a local consumer demand produced by decades of negative growth. 
• From a sectoral perspective, most FDI (about 75 percent) is going into manufacturing 
(including agro-processing). 
• Tax incentives especially on imported intermediate goods have led to a bias towards 
'import-substitutingt instead of export-oriented industries. 
• High concentration in Kampala - about 75% of projects licensed since 1991. Kampala 
provides good market for the manufactured goods and services; relatively high levels of 
human capital; and has the utilities (water, power and telecommunications) which are 
relatively more reliable. 
• Most investors come from UK, Canada, Kenya and India and have previous experience 
in Uganda. In fact, the majority are the returning Asians who were expelled from the 
country in 1972. 
• This group of Asians has an informational advantage over other potential investors. The 
media coverage on good economic arid political performance is often offset by 
media-worthy reports on Amin, fighting in the North and AIDS, wiping out Uganda from 
investors' shortlist. 
• Actual value adding in manufacturing is limited and some investors just repack imported 
materials into new containers bearing new names for resale. This is more so with paints. 
• Most investments are of high degree of vertical integration. Vertical integration occurs 
where a seller of a final product gains control over the production of various inputs that 
go towards making the product. For example, in tourism, a vertically integrated chain 
would involve a firm controlling the tour organization and marketing, ground transport 
and accommodation. Benefits include security of supply, greater control over prices and 
product quality. 
• A number of investors are not creating the planned employment for Ugandans as 
stipulated in their investment plans. 
• Although the investment code disallows importation of raw materials and construction 
materials available in Uganda, investors have gone ahead to import them (tax free) and 
quite often end up trading in them. 
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Investorst pre- and operational problems 
No one-stop shop 13: There is a difference between stated purpose and actual function 
of the UJA as a one-stop shop. There is wide discrepancy between the rhetoric in the 
Code and the reality of the application processes. A true one-stop shop does not exist in 
Uganda as UTA is not empowered to grant all licenses needed for operation and cannot 
guarantee access to serviced land for investors. 
• While the powers of administration of foreign investments are vested in the UTA, at the 
same time many agencies still maintain the real decision-making capacity. 
• The government is sincerely advocating for FDI as evidenced by the creation of the UIA 
under the Investment Code in addition to extensive measures promoting privatization, but 
these efforts are diluted as the initiatives trickle down through the reluctant institutional 
structures. There is an apparent gap between the pronouncements by government leaders 
on the need and desirability for foreign investment and the actual handling of applications 
and paperwork by lower level of bureaucrats. For example, UIA may license an investor 
for one incentive which is interpreted and implemented differently by the revenue 
collectors. Thus even after being certified for incentives the version which is received 
may be diluted significantly. 
• Business registration : There is no publication of what steps an investor must follow to 
become operational. In addition, there is no time scale or itemization of the registration 
costs involved. In most cases one has to make several trips to different sections of the 
registration process - where more paperwork is added almost arbitrarily by bureaucrats.15 
• Serviced land : The difficulty of obtaining land is often attributed to bureaucratic 
entanglements, legal constraints and scarcity of serviced land. Even when these problems 
are resolved and the land is located. more of theses are added. For instance, an investor 
then has to obtain land titles or official leasing certification which although critical for 
the security, can take years to obtain. 
• Trading licenses : The anti-export bias inherent in Uganda's policy is compounded by 
the lack of transparency in getting a trading license. The Trade (Licensing) Act of 1969 
grants the Minister excessive discretion to alter an already unclear process. The Minister 
has the power to declare, by Statutory Order, which goods cannot be traded by a 
non-citizen, reduce any fee payable or refuse to grant a trading license without reason. 
See Figinc I. 
4 
In practice dealing with LJIA is like playing snakes-and ladders in the dark.. Foreign investors supposedly can go 
stmight back down into the up the ladder from the one-stop ULA. But a snake waits on the next square taking them 
straight back down into the bureaucracy. The UIA carries so little weight with other ministries that it is known not as 
a one-step shop hut a toothless, yet another one-more-StOp. Bureaucratic institutions include NEMA. UNBS, 
Kampala City Council and the utility companies IJPTC, (JEB, NWSC and the Inspectorate of Factories. 
A recent U!A study has confirmed that there are at least 12 decisions UIA to be visited before any business is 
operated in Uganda. This may explain why thete is an enorme discrepancy between FDI licensed by the UIA and PD! 
actually implemented. 
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The cumbersome and frustrating method of obtaining a trading license is not published 
but must be found out incrementally as the investor goes from one agency to another. 
Tax administration The changing status of tax incentives combined with the pressure 
applied by the international donors to boost revenue collection and the ambiguous 
delegation of powers leaves the URA free to exploit a muddled tax system. 
Because schedules of revenue collection are not clear, the URA uses this excuse to visit 
businesses at will to review accounts and look for loopholes to levy other taxes. The tax 
code is often open to abuse and misinterpretation without accounting for defunct tax laws 
which remain on books. There is no up todate coherent set of rules to protect investors 
from arbitrary collection by the URA. There is no one document listing the 30-plus taxes 
and investors can be ambushed by the tax authority with demands for back tax over 
several years. 
• Legal system : According to a 1995 IJSAID study, the Ugandan administration of justice 
is 'plagued with long delays, lack of publications and non-transparency, encouraging 
corruption and making business planning difficult'. Many foreign investors interviewed 
try to avoid the judicial system altogether and pursue private arbitration when absolutely 
necessary. In addition to inexplicable delays in judicial decision, the courts have been 
under public scrutiny for corruption. 
• Location Investors feel that Uganda is a difficult location for a business operation since 
it is landlocked (imported raw materials and fuel have to travel long distances compared 
to her regional partners. Kenya and Tanzania), the infrastructure is poor (therefore high 
transport costs), utility services are expensive and unreliable, labour market conditions 
are bad (labour productivity is low with high wage demand). access to export markets is 
difficult. etc. 
Foreign investors16 and the locals 
• In an attempt to attract new investments through tax exemptions the Investment Code 
inequalities in the environment by making those older existing foreign and local 
businesses uncompetitive. 
• Local firms complain that they are being squeezed out of business by foreign firms which 
use cheap offshore capital whereas the local firms have to borrow money at higher 
interest rates from local banks. 
• While many of the tax incentives granted are legally non-discriminatory between local 
and foreign investors, in practice they sometimes have an inherent - though unintended 
- bias against local investors. 
Foreign firm are MNC and non-MNCs. MNCs are defined as firms which have a parent firm in the home COLlfltr 
and non-MNCs as those which do not have parent firms hut are financed by investment of individuals or investment 
companies OIItS1CIC lJganda. 
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In general, foreign firms pay much higher wages than domestic firms, which suggests that 
incoming foreign investment may help to raise living standards for a certain proportion 
of the population. 
Notwithstanding this, however, there is a feeling that there is widespread exploitation of 
unskilled laboui especially in small- and medium sized foreign owned firms. The terms 
and conditions of service are poor, for example, wages sometimes range from as low as 
35,000 to 70,000 shillings per month and such workers have no appointment letters or 
identity cards. They can be fired without any warning and are denied the right to be 
unionized, thus contravening Trade Union Decree No. 22. 
• Managerial positions in foreign firms are often filled by the 'expatriates' some of whom 
have doubtful qualifications. 
• Because of corrupt tendencies and other malpractices in the immigration department, 
work permits are often issued without serious scrutiny as to the suitability of such 
imported labour. 
Difficulties of dealing with government agencies 
• The URA has been singled out as the most difficult agency to deal with. This assessment 
arises out of the URA's arbitrary assessments, lengthy delays in clearance of documents 
and goods, and hostile attitudes of some revenue agents. Investors complain that URA 
has excessive discretion, lack clarity and many of its officers are corrupt. 
• Many investors have complained of URA revoking incentives given by the UIA, 
especially with regard to tax holidays. With a defunct Tax Appeals Court, the only 
recourse businesses have in disputing a tax liability is through an appeal to Tax 
Commissioner, hardly a neutral arbitrator. 
UTA and URA are pushed towards goals by external forces that contradict each other over 
the same jurisdiction. The UIA with half of its funding from USAID, 'exists to promote 
a liberal competitive code, ease investment constraints, and encourage inward investment 
through competitive tax incentives'. The degree of its success is measured by how much 
investment is attracted to Uganda. On the other hand, URA is under increasing pressure 
to collect more revenue. With substantial financial support from ODA, IMIF and World 
Bank. URA's success is measured by the degree of revenue maximisation rather than by 
cl-eating a good working relationship with tax payers. 
This URA/UIA contradiction is a serious problem which needs to be addressed to 
improve the investment environment. 
The UEB is very unpopular with those mainly in the manufacturing sector. The power 
supply is irregular and UEB tariffs are said to be higher than those in the neighbouring 
Kenya and Tanzania. 
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VIII. The impact of FD1 on the Uganda economy 
The impact of FDI on a country depends on many factors, such as the role of FDIs in the 
economy, the sector in which FDI is undertaken, the type of investment (eg. export-oriented or 
import-substituting), links of foreign affiliates with the host economy and on the conditions in 
the country. 
Inadequate statistical data on FDI and the performance of MNCs in Uganda make it very difficult 
to assess their overall and specific impacts on the economy. What exists - some limited data on 
some aspects of FDI - allows only cautious assessment about the scope and the direction of 
possible impacts in a number of areas. 
Output and employment (Table A 1-2) 
The most aggregate impact of foreign investors on the economy is their contribution to output 
and job creation, measured by their share in GDP and other economic aggregates (eg. 
employment). 
Table Al shows how the relative importance of FDI flows, based on annual averages in three 
periods, was changing relative to GDP between 1981 and 1993. The FDIIGDP ratio which has 
been negative until 1991, the year when liberalization of FDI policies started, became positive 
0.07. This is still vell below the African average of 0.89. 
As to the sectoral dimension of the FDI impact, it has been in the domestic-market oriented, 
import-substituting type of investment in manufacturing, encouraged by trade protection and near 
monopoly positions. Its main contribution is to job creation and increased output of manufactured 
goods. Foreign investors in these industries co-exit with local firms, but in most cases they have 
not established linkages with the local economy and depend on imported inputs for their 
production. Their qualitative impact on the economy is therefore very limited. Although FDI is 
meant to be a relief for the balance of payments, they are increasingly seen as a burden because 
of importedinputs and transferred investment income'7. 
Marketing and trading strategies 
Trading firms have played a crucial role in supporting the export of primaiy commodities through 
joint ventures with local companies, by serving as buying agents on behalf of other firms, or by 
exporting on their own account. For example, in the coffee industry, crop finance which used to 
be a headache to the government is no more. According to Uganda Coffee Development 
Authority, foreign buyers with access to cheap offshore funds now provide over 90% of 
pre-financing. 
The trading function is important because a comparative advantage in producing a good does not 
necessarily imply a comparative advantage in its marketing. The need for relatively high skills 
for internatiofial trading services suggests that Uganda could go through a period when they enjoy 
full judgernent about the impact of import-substituting FDI on the balance of payment would only be possible if a 
counter—factual situation could be constructed. 
a comparative advantage in producing certain commodities but not marketing them. In such a 
case, the role of transnational trading companies can be a useful supplement to the country's 
exporting efforts. As examples of some developing countries in Asia show, with time, countries 
may not only successfully produce but also successfully market their commodities. 
Domestic in vestment (Table A3) 
The contribution to doniestic investment is potentially important, especially in Uganda, where 
the level of domestic savings is extremely low and in fact has been negative during the 1980s and 
early I 990s (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Investment ratios in Uganda 























Source: World Economic Outlook 
Table 3A in the Appendix reveals that the share of FDI in gross domestic investment which has 
been negative throughout the 1980s has increased to 0.80 during the period 1991-1993. 
Although this is well below the African average of 4.50 during the same period, it is by no means 
a remarkable achievement for Uganda. During the same period Kenya's figure was 0.71. 
Balance of payments (Table A4) 
The impact of foreign investments on the balance of payments is of special interest (see Table 
A4). Positive contributions include inflows of foreign capital to initiate and/or expand projects; 
export revenues if investors are export-oriented or contribute to exports indirectly; and savings 
of foreign exchange from import substitution. Burdens for the country's balance of payments 
include remittances of profits, fees and royalty payments to parent companies; imports of goods 
and services, and transfers of salaries by expatriate employees. The net foreign exchange effects 
depend on a number of factors that determine the size of foreign exchange credits and debits 
associated with each foreign affiliate over its entire existence. Indirect effects can be quite 
important among them; by supplying better and/or cheaper goods and services to local exporting 
firms, foreign affiliates can increase the competitiveness of the country's exports. 
The overall impact of FDI on the balance of payments of Uganda cannot be ascertained with 
precision because the data on credits and debits needed for making such an assessment are not 
disaggregated by foreign versus domestic ownership of firms. 
The problem is complicated by the way FDI is presented. FDI has been lumped together in the 
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balance of payments (BOP) totals of private transfers alongside unrecorded exports, remittances 
by Ugandans abroad, NGO transfers, etc. The liberalization of foreign exchange market, 
however, has made estimation of FDI difficult because some people bring hard currency into the 
country, exchange it at the various bureaus and start up business in the country. 
However, export oriented FDIs have had a positive impact on the balance of payments. On the 
other hand, the impact of FDJs in import-substituting industries on the balance of payments is 
often negative inflows have frequently been offset by payments for related intermediate inputs 
and outflows of dividends and other forms of corporate payments. 
However, direct investment should strengthen the balance of payments in the long run, as it adds 
to the productive capacity of the economy. When the investment is profitable, it generates profits 
which are payable overseas. This affects the balance of payments in two ways. First, the 
additional capacity increases the ability of the economy to finance payments overseas and second, 
it increases the amount which the economy must pay overseas. This applies whether the direct 
foreign investment is in import-substituting or export-creating industries. Investment in 
import-competing industries frees up foreign exchange which would otherwise be used to 
purchase imports, while investment in export industries increases the amount of foreign exchange 
available to finance the repatriation of profits. Of course, should the direct investment make 
losses in the long run, then there are no profits and therefore no balance-of-payments effects. 
The growth generated in the economy by direct investment helps overcome so-called repayment 
problem. As long as there are growth opportunities in the host country, direct investment will 
continue to flow in. Furthermore, many of the overseas-owned companies will not leave the 
country as long as there are growth and profit opportunities. Over time the growth of wealth in 
the country will provide opportunities for Ugandans to acquire shares in the foreign-owned 
companies. 
However, should the direct foreign investment occur behind high tariff barriers or other forms 
of protection, the outcome will be far less desirable. Overseas firms attracted to the country may 
make artificially high profits because of protection. The repatriation of such profits may then 
have a detrimental effect on the growth of the economy. There are a number of examples of 
foreign-owned firms in the Uganda manufacturing industry which have been ardent supporters 
of protection and have been content to inefficiently supply the small Ugandan market. These 
firms (which do not grow, do not achieve economies of scale and do not export) produce 
high-priced locally made goods, free from the positive effects of competition from imports. The 
opening up of the economy to competition can eliminate these undesirable consequences of the 
foreign investment. 
Technology transfers and human resource development 
Capita] is one of the benefits of FDI for Uganda. Others indude transfer of technology, the 
development of human resources those related to backward and forward linkages. 
The question of technology transfer is difficult to assess. In the case of the many industrial and 
agro-business affiliates that were established through FDI in the 1960s, the pattern appears to 
have been one in which technologies have been operated with decreasing skill and precision over 
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time. This was partly because, in many cases, there was either no continuing relationship with 
the former supplier or only a minimal one. This is different from the experience of countries in 
East Asia which sought to minimize equity investment from abroad during the 1960s and instead 
encouraged technology-sharing agreements. 
As regards the development of human resources, a popular proxy measure in the literature has 
been the share of expatriates versus local personnel in managerial positions in foreign affiliates. 
In the case of Uganda, these ratios are generally high. 
Another impact in the area of human resources concerns working conditions and salaries in 
foreign companies. There seem to be some important intersectoral differences illustrating a 
different impact of the services and manufacturing firms in Uganda. If wages are taken as a proxy 
for skills, FDI in services involve much higher skills than in manufacturing. Two factors account 
for this: the nontradability of services, and their reliance on human rather than physical capital. 
Both mean that a parent MNC in services establishing an affiliate in the country has to reproduce, 
in distinction from manufacturing firms, factor and skill proportions used at home. The impact 
on Uganda then depends on its labour market: if needed skills are abundant, the contribution of 
foreign affiliates will be to increase employment. If skills are scare, foreign affiliates may have 
to import them, divert them from local companies by higher pay or train them; under the last of 
these conditions, soft technology is transferred to the host country. 
Tax revenues 
Advocates of foreign investment point to its capacity to generate tax revenue. However, this does 
not necessarily suggest a net increase in tax revenue. If the activity is funded locally, a similar 
amount of tax revenue can also be collected. Only if it is shown that the investment would not 
have occurred without the foreign capital could it be argued that the increased tax revenue is 
attributable to the foreign investment. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, pricing policies 
of foreign-owned multinational firms may prevent taxation benefits from being realized. 
Foreign-owned firms sometimes engage in transfer pricing, whereby non-market prices are used 
to shift profits between subsidiaries operating in different countries so as to maximize profits 
where taxes are lowest. This practice could involve a substantial loss of tax revenue for the host 
country. 
Fiscal burden of tax holidays 
Uganda's tax/GDP ratio is low18 at around 22 percent by 1995/96 Ministry of Finance estimates. 
This is well below the 42 percent for European Union. 
The annual revenue loss arising out of the tax holidays alone provided to investors under the 
Code is estimated at US$7 million which adds up to about 19 percent of the corporate income 
revenues collected in 1994. According to the estimates by the Ministry of Finance foregone 
revenue from import duty and sales tax exemptions in 1994 were US$11.2 million and JS$9.1 
million, respectively. 
The tax base too is nanow with percent coming from corporation tax, percent fiom PAYE and niost of the remainder 
from duty (35 percent), exice duty (10 percent) and sales Lax ISO percent. 
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This fiscal loss borne by the Government in its attempt to influence private investment 
behaviour could be reduced considerably if they are designed to take account of the 
inter-dependency between the tax laws of the capital exporting countries and the concessionary 
tax laws of the Government. Recognizing that, under the present practice of blanket provision 
of tax concessions, certain capital exporting countries give credit only for taxes actually paid 
abroad while taxing repatriated tax-free profits, there is a prima facie case that tax holidays may 
not serve as an incentive, and that capital importing countries like Uganda are sacrificing revenue 
unnecessarily. Some provision may very well be made whereby firms demonstrate proof that tax 
concessions can be utilized before receiving the concessions. 
Estimation of the FOl and growth model 
The decision by foreigners to invest in a given country depends on a wide range of factors in the 
host country. Among the major ones are: the availability and cost of natural and human 
resources; adequacy of infrastructure and support facilities; market size trade policies and other 
t1-t ff"-'t ml r,rm' ct,hfl4t, rr,rmr ctrnuith ,ind 1v1 cf dpvpIrrmpnt cnd 
political stability. The importance attached to each of these factors depends on the type of 
investment and the motivations or strategy of investors. 
Relative costs influence location decisions, but low direct labour costs are not of as much 
importance as is commonly believed. In fact, the importance of low-cost unskilled labour in 
location decisions has declined in recent years and greater emphasis is now placed on skills and 
the 'trainability' of workers. 
Moreover, in many industries, direct labour costs now account for only 10 to 15 percent of 
manufacturing costs, and the share is even smaller in some industries. In contrast, because of 
white collar and supervisory roles, labour costs have been rising in the more developed countries, 
it has become increasingly attractive to invest in countries that offer low-wage high technology 
skills pool of labour. As multinationals transfer ever more sophisticated production lines to 
developing countries, the availability and cost of skilled labour becomes of growing importance. 
Market size .is also significant in affecting location decisions. Larger economies have attracted 
the bulk of FDI. This is because of the potential for local sales. In small economies, FDI usually 
concentrates on production for export. 
There is also somewhat of a 'herd effect' with potential investors following where others are 
already operating successfully. Further, as more firms invest in a countly, synergies and linkages 
develop among them. 
Costs are also affected by adequacy of infrastructural facilities and the supply of utilities. 
Unreliable transport and telecommunication services and insufficient power or water supply 
create operational bottlenecks which could be very costly. In addition, the existence of efficient 
financial and other support facilities which can cater to the diversified needs of investors is also 
necessary. 
The host countrys poiicies with respect to restricting or welcoming FDI will obviously also affect 
the magnitude and character of FDI. Not only will the policies have direct effect on FDL hut they 
will also affect whether the foreign firm wishes to export or license instead of having a direct 
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production investment in the foreign country. 
Finally, the importance of political stability in creating a climate of confidence for investors 
cannot be underestimated. Political instability, whether perceived or real, constitutes a serious 
deterrent for FDI as it creates uncertainties and increases risks and hence costs. 
There is no doubt that in order to determine quantitative and perhaps more precise relationship(s) 
between the above factors and FDI in Uganda, it is necessary to specify and estimate a model 
linking them. 
Based on the Ugandan situation and availability of consistent data series, the following model 
is specified and estimated: 
FBI determinants equation 
(1) FDI = aU + aI2GDPGR + a13GDP + a14TB + a15INF + aI6PPEGDP + 
aI7DSR + aI8EDSGDP + el 
Growth equation 
(2) GDPGR = a21 ± a22FDI + a23GDS + a24OCF + a25EXGR + a26AID + e2 
where 
FDI = Foreign Direct Investment, 
GDP = Gross domestic product, 
GDPGR = Annual growth rate of GDP, 
TB = Trade account balance, 
INF = inflation rate 
PPEGDP = proportion of public expenditure to GDP, 
DSR = Domestic savings rate, 
EDSGDP = external debt service as a proportion of GDP. 
GDS = gross domestic savings as proportion of GDP, 
EXGR = rate of growth of real exports, 
AID = net current transfers to government plus official long-term borrowing, 
OCF = other capital inflows, 
el, e2 = stochastic disturbance terms. 
Superficially. the model just puts together two single equations which are rather familiar in the 
literature of FDI. The economic implications are, however, quite different from those of single 
equation models. In the simultaneous equation model, both GDPGR and FDI are endogenous 
variables. GDPGR can affect FDI via equation (1), but FDI can in turn affect GDPGR via 
equation (2). The interdependence of FDI and GDPGR does not exist in a single equation model 
where either FDI of GDPGR is treated as exogenous. Neglecting the interdependence may result 
in biased and inconsistent estimates. Accordingly, the model consisting of (1) and (2) is more 
appropriate in capturing the underlying relationship among variables from the point of view of 
both economic theory and statistical investigation. 
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The independent variables capture some structural characteristics of the economy and are related 
to economic policy which can be adjusted by policy makers in order to make FDI more attractive. 
Rate of inflation is preferred to exchange rate because the cost of the latter in Uganda fuels 
inflation. The inflation rate is also a proxy of some measures of macroeconomic stability. The 
high debt service EDSGDP overhang describes both the structure of the economy and political 
effects. 
Government's behaviour is also important. Thus the share of government consumption in GDP 
is included to capture the size of government. 
The FDI determinants equation 
Equation (1) includes most of the frequently mentioned quantifiable 
demand side determinants of FDI..19 The variables GDP and GDPGR stand respectively for the 
market size hypothesis and the growth hypothesis. The market size stresses the necessity of large 
market size for efficient utilization of resources and the exploitation of economies of scale. As 
the market size grows to some critical value, the hypothesis asserts that FDI will start and 
increase thereafter with the expansion of the market size (Scaperlanda and Mauer, 1969; Torrisi, 
1985). Moreover, GDP can be used to capture the influence of proven economic performance. 
The higher the value of GDP implies, in addition to greater domestic market, better infrastructure 
and hence provides greater incentive for FDI. The growth hypothesis postulates a positive 
relationship between FDI, GDPGR, PPEGDP and DSR. 
According to the theories of FDI, developed nations will tend to invest in poorer countries that 
have a higher rate of return. in Uganda, the capital market is not well developed hence the return 
on capital is being proxied with GDPGR. The argument is that a rapidly growing economy 
provides relatively better opportunities for making profits than the ones growing slowly or not 
at all (Lim, 1983). Thus an impressive rate of economic growth will be taken as a favorable 
signal by international investors when making investment decisions. 
The relationship between trade balance (TB) and FDI is rather complex and there are diverse 
predictions about this relationship (see, for example, Torrisi, 1985; Tsai, 1994). Following Fry's 
(1983) view, along with the argument of the two-gap model that foreign exchange is one of the 
key constraints on economic growth in developing countries, it is not difficult to understand the 
relation between trade balance and FDI. When a country faces growing trade deficits, it is 
expected to adopt more favorable policies to facilitate inflow of FDI. 
The growth equation 
The growth equation is derived from a neoclassical aggregate production function comprising 
exports (see, for example, Gupta and Islam, 1983: Ram, 1985). There are reasons to include the 
export variable in the growth equation. It is well documented that trade, especially exports, may 
increase competition, permit the realization of comparative advantage, enable countries to 
Admittedly. there are noneconomic, qualitative factors such as political stability and incentive policies that ale of 
vital importance in determining FDI.. The difficulties and controversies in defing and quantifying these variables 
prevent the study from including them in the analysis. Although Root and Ahrned (1979) suggested the use of 
discriminant analysis to avoid problems in regression analysis. there is still a problem of assigning categorical index 
to each qualitative vadable 
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purchase goods from abroad, and provide opportunities to gain access to new technology as well 
as managerial skills (Voivodas, 1973; Tyler, 1981; Ram, 1985; Rana and Dowling, 1988; Otani 
and Villanueva, 1989). 
The impact of FDI on economic growth is one of the most controversial topics in development 
economics. According to the modernization hypothesis, FDI promotes economic growth by 
providing external capital and through growth, spreads the benefits throughout the economy. It 
is the presence, rather than the origin of investment that is considered to be important. Moreover, 
FDI usually brings with it advanced technology, and better management and organization. FDI, 
is. in fact, the other engine' of growth in developing countries. Contrary to this modernization 
hypothesis, the dependency hypothesis, while admitting a possible short-term positive impact of 
the flow of FDI on economic growth, insists that there is deleterious long-term impact of FDI on 
economic growth 
as reflected in the negative correlation between the stock of FDI and growth rate. In the short-run, 
any increase in FDI enables higher investment and consumption and thus creates directly and 
immediately to economic growth. However, as FDI accumulates and foreign projects take hold, 
there will be adverse effects on the rest of the economy that reduce economic growth. This is due 
to the intervening mechanisms of dependency, in particular, 'decapitalization' and 
'disarticulation' (lack of linkages) (Stoneman, 1975; Bornschier, 1980; Ohearn, 1990). 
Some economists have argued that political, social and cultural factors play crucial roles in 
determining the growth performance of a country. Others have argued that the impact of FDI on 
economic growth might vary across countries because of different stages of development. 
From the preceding discussions, the expected signs for the coefficients of GDPGR and GDP are 
positive, whereas that of TB is negative. In the growth equation, the coefficient of FDI denotes 
the impact of FDI on economic growth. According to modernization hypothesis, it should be 
positive. But dependency hypothesis would expect the coefficient FDI to be uncertain. Finally, 
the variable GDS is so standard in a production function that it is unnecessary to repeat the 
rationale of including it. As usual, the coefficient of GDS is expected to be positive. 
Empirical results 
Beacuse of the likely simultaneity between FDI arid growth, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation method has been used. The period covered is from 1981 to 1995. Note that the R2 
defined for the 2SLS does not have the usual interpretation for R2 as the proportion of variance 
explained by the regression. 
Table 5: FDI determinants and growth equation 






















EXGR 0.726* * 
(2.049) 
AID 0.256* * 
(4.895) 




R2 80 35 
Note The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics 
indicates significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
All sources of funds have a positive impact on the growth rate, with flows to the public sector 
having the strongest effect. Table 5 reveals a number of interesting observations, for example. 
(a) The overall performance of the FDI determinants equation are quite satisfactory with a 
computed F-value of 21.09 which far exceeded the critical F-value at 5% significance level. All 
the coefficients are correctly signed and three of them are statistically different from zero. The 
fact that the coefficient of GDPGR is statistically significant confirms the existence of 
simultaneity problem. Both the market size and the growth hypotheses are supported by the 
study. The significant negative correlation between FDI and TB indicates that a deterioration of 
the trade balance does, as expected. lead a country to adopting more liberal policies toward FDI. 
High and unpredictable inflation, a proxy for macroeconomic instability, distorts the 
information content of the market prices and the incentive structure. As the results above, this 
impacted negatively on FDT. 
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(b) As expected, FDI impacts on growth positively though the coefficient is insignificant. 
The importance of the export variable reaffirms the findings of most researchers (see, for 
example, Ram, 1985). 
(c) The estimation results suggest that foreign AID and other capital inflows (OCF) 
significantly influenced growth through public sector investment in Uganda over the period 
198 1-1995. For, example, foreign aid resulted in an increase growth by approximately 25.6% 
which was statistically significant (with t-value of 4.895). 
In conclusion, it can be argued that foreign aid has promoted FDI through its effects on public 
sector investment between 198 1-1995. These results are consistent with what is being observed 
on the ground with a number of foreign firms springing up in and around major towns especially 
Kampala, Jinja and Mbarara. 
While thes empirical results based on a small sample suggest that foreign AID and other capital 
inflows have had a positive effect on FDI through their effects on public sector investment in the 
short-run, a developing country like Uganda must also be concerned with the long-run 
sustainability of the macroeconomic stability and external debt. 
IX Policy considerations 
Policies that are conducive to sustained growth and macro-economic stability are essential 
elements of an enabling investment environment. They are as important to foreign investors as 
they are to domestic ones, as they determine risks and profitability of investment. During the last 
decade, Uganda pursued more liberal policies on trade and investment and other market-oriented 
reforms in the context of structural adjustment programmes. Although the full impact of these 
measures may take time to materialize, they would eventually lead to increased competitiveness 
and efficiency. 
No doubt, foreign investors can and have a major role to play in the country's economic 
development. They should therefore be encouraged and facilitated. 
The general message from our survey and empirical findings is that, from the view point of 
attracting investment, the macroeconomic and political stability and policy consistency are much 
more important than the level of the incentives themselves. This view has important 
consequences for the macroeconomic policy-making and for the design of reform programs to 
promote investment. 
From the macroeconomic viewpoint, the key policy implication is that to encourage the 
investment response to incentive schemes, macroeconomic stability and investor confidence in 
the sustainability of the policy framework are essential. Thus, the government must correct the 
unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances - such as large public deficits - because they are a 
primary cause of macroeconomic instability and uncertainty about future policies. Institutional 
reforms to ensure policy predictability, effective property rights, and stability of the basic 'rules 
of the game' can contribute significantly to the investment response. 
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Uganda's courageous and sustained policy changes have allowed considerable progress toward 
macroeconomic balance and a market-based incentive structure. While private investment has 
recovered dramatically over the last five years, it has concentrated in the manufacturing and 
service sectors. The private investment response in agriculture has so far been disappointing and 
poses a great challenge. The World Bank has been instrumental in identifying and addressing key 
constraints to private sector activities, as well as a large lending program of financial support and 
technical assistance. 
Uganda's stabilization effort was embodied in an economic recovery program that induced 
liberalization of the foreign exchange market, dismantling of price and distribution controls, and 
fiscal policy reform eliminating subsidies, improving tax collection, and redirecting spending to 
improve operations and maintenance and privatization of public enterprises. 
The establishment of UIA addresses, in particular: (i) business establishment and investment 
licensing procedures; (ii) commercial legal framework; (iii) Technology transfers and investment 
promotion; and (iv) improvements in access to crucial economic information. 
Efficient private sector-led growth requires some combination of increased private investment, 
enhanced productivity of private firms, and competition. The presence of a thriving business 
community creates a supportive environment for FDI and provides an efficient network of local 
suppliers and service firms. It cold also be a source for potential partners in joint ventures, which 
could facilitate access to local administration and supporting services. Joint ventures are an 
efficient mechanism for effecting technology and skill transfers and for developing stronger 
linkages with the domestic economy. 
The setting up of the Private Sector Foundation in 1996 is a welcome development. The 
objectives of the Foundation are: (i) help improve the business and investment environment by 
decreasing policy constraints to private sector development; (ii) strengthen institutional support 
to the private sector; (iii) enhance dialogue between the private sector and the Government on 
policies and regulations which affect private investment; and (iv) alleviate problems associated 
with inadequate know-how and the weak financial system. 
In order to create an environment that is more conducive to increased flows of FDI, government 
has to continue the efforts aimed at policy liberalization and introduce new measures and 
mechanisms to attract and accelerate the flow of FDI. We suggest below policy options, which 
may be additional to measures already in place, that merit special considerations by policy 
makers in government. 
All policy recommendations must be aimed at fulfilling a balance between investment promotion, 
administrative simplicity and revenue generation. Each pressure group has different intentions. 
For example, as was pointed out earlier, some international donors and URA tend focus on 
revenue generation without considering the ramifications on the investment facilitation. The key 
is to filter the good intentions of each group and propose a reform package that is based on the 
limited capacity of the government, the desperate need for optimizing revenue generation and yet 
still fulfill the ultimate goal of increasing FDI flows. 
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Genera! policies for enhancing an enabling investment environment and 
increasing FDI inflows 
POt : Change in general attitudes towards work ethics and debureaucratization 
There is an urgent need to reorient the attitude of workers especially government officials to the 
new and changing environment. Their role should be to facilitate and to nurture private 
investment. 
The politicians, civil servants, custom officers, opposition politicians, and people generally in 
the country must encourage foreign investors. There should be no bias causing anti-foreign 
attitudes resulting into locals hating or fearing investors. 
Government and donors should organize seminars to educate civil servants on their new role. 
Further, for civil servants to serve the investors better, steps must be taken to improve their terms 
of service. Present terms make civil servants susceptible to corruption. Therefore, rationalization 
of these terms will not only help reduce or stem corruption, but will also improve their 
productivity. 
To encounter the red tape issue, government should vigorously continue the efforts aimed at the 
deregulation and debureaucratization in the licensing and approval process, customs, clearing 
offices, etc. to reduce unnecessarily high costs to the economy. 
P02: Government to improve the risk rating 
By 1992, not only Africa was rated as the most risky region, but Uganda was rated as the riskiest 
of the 25 African countries covered by Institutional Investor. 
However for the past three years (1994-96), Uganda's risk rating has improved by 2.5 points per 
annum (Collier, 1996). Even with this recovery, Uganda's risk rating places it near the bottom 
despite its reforms and its growth rate which place it at the top of the African league table. 
Therefore, either unilaterally or through bilateral treaties, the government need to offer some 
assurances designed to reduce the likelihood of expropriation or impairment of investors' rights 
and to insure investors adequate recourse if such impairments should occur. Along with 
guarantees against risk and measures for the arbitration of investment disputes, such as by the 
World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency, considerable attention should be given to compensation for any 
loss suffered from other than normal business causes. This will help to minimize the investors' 
risk and give some advance assurance of a reliable safety margin. Typically, some 
capital-supplying nations have provided insurance coverage such as the United States' Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). OPIC can offer up to 90 percent coverage for three types 
of risk: inconvertibility of assets; war, revolution, or insurrection; and expropriation. 
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P03 : Government policy credibility: clear policy guidelines, consistency and 
transparency 
Several studies indicate the importance of a stable macroeconomic environment for investment. 
An update of the Adjustment in Africa study by the World Bank (1995) shows that two thirds of 
the countries that improved their macro policies (fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies) also 
experienced an improvement in domestic investment performance, while in the group of 
countries that experienced a deterioration in macro performance, only one of the countries 
experienced an increase in investment. 
So far the government macroeconomic policy has been consistent. Fiscal discipline, heeding the 
advice of the international donors, and implementation of major reforms have been instituted 
consistently and have been predictable. Proof of this is the low and stable inflation rate, 
market-based exchange rate and the on-going privatisation exercise. 
Despite the macroeconomic policy predictability20, which is also guided by international donors, 
micro regulatory policies affecting FDI directly are of a stop-go' type and remain a serious 
impediment to investments in the country. 
What the government must know is that such 'stop-go' inconsistent and unpredictable policies 
are harmful and tend to undermine the credibility of the government and taints the overall policy 
environment. The establishment of clear, accountable rules which are implemented consistently 
is fundamental in attracting FDI as well as minimizing government corruption. 
Inconsistency of micro policies in Uganda stems from influences on decision-making processes 
of the various pressure and/or interest groups such as international donors, government agencies 
(eg. UTA, URA. etc.), private sector (eg. UMA, PSF, importers and Exporters association), 
foreign investors and politicians. These groups have different and sometimes contradicting 
interests. For example, URA is funded to increase revenue while UIA is to promote investment 
through tax incentives. 
Finally, the other important item of a functional positive policy environment is transparency. 
Land allocafion, license acquisition, tax payments and related activities are all riddled with 
superfluous complexities. These difficulties can be minimized through a simple measure of 
publici sing the necessary procedures and regulations. Establishing clear, accountable rules which 
are implemented consistently are fundamental in attracting FDI as well as minirnising 
bureaucratic red tape and accompanying administrative costs. More importantly, the 
simplification of the procedures will eliminate many of the opportunities for corruption arising 
out of a policy environment where the rules are vaguely established and interpreted. 
P04: Infrastructure and local capacity building 
The incentives available to investors are mainly of a fiscal nature and are short in the areas of 
financial and other infrastructural services incentives where many other developing countries are 
20 
Predictability should not be confused with conservation and unwillingness to change. Rather, the point is that 
frequent changes in the 'rules of the game' are inimical to individual risk-taking and innovations. New initiatives 
flourish best when public performance is not to volatile. 
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doing much better. This skewed position in favour of fiscal incentives cause the scheme to appear 
to possess a foreign and urban bias. 
In view of the competing priorities which include social expenditure and maintenance of existing 
infrastructure, government is increasingly recognizing the role and potential of the private sector 
in providing infrastructural services as opposed to the traditional approach where the public 
sector has been largely responsible.2' For example, among the countries that have tried to attract 
private investors to finance and operate infrastructure facilities are the Philippines and India. 
Reforms to improve the efficiency and provision of infrastructure can include privatization or 
contracting out which reduce both excessive government involvement in production and weak 
infrastructural support. The burden of poorly functioning infrastructure - and thus the benefit of 
reform - falls unevenly across different types of investors depending on their financial ability to 
undertake remedial capital expenditure.22 
Utility providers especially the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) should organize their internal 
operations to reduce service installation time and costs and improve on the quality of their 
services. 
Besides modem infrastructure, an increasingly important factor in attracting FDI is the 
availability of low-wage but good technical and skills base. 
The ability to compete internationally in the new global economy requires a level of productivity 
and managerial and technical skills that is presently lacking in Uganda. A policy to build human 
capital should also aim to develop a broad array of technical, managerial, and scientific skills 
needed to sustain rapid growth. 
There is therefore a great need for mid-level technical and supervisory skills in Uganda. 
Government should consider removing constraints on the employment of expatriates where such 
constraints reduce the overall capacity of investors to operate efficiently. This may involve a 
greater willingness to grant work permits to foreigners where it is clear that no appropriately 
qualified Ugandans are available for particular positions, and the introduction of incentive 
measures to attract highly skilled foreigners. At the same time, more business training centres 
should be established to improve local capacity and create practical skills in areas such as 
manufacturing, i ndustiy and banking. 
Finally, the skills and capital of overseas Ugandans and capital held abroad by resident citizens 
are an important resource that should be considered in efforts to build local skills and technology 
See the Workshop Proceedings on 'Policy aspects of promoting and implementing FDI in infrastructure in Eastern 
and Southern Africa organized! by the Foreign investment Advisory Services, a joint service of International Finance 
Corporation and the World Bank. The Workshop was held on 28 March 1996 at Windsor Lake Victoria Hotel, 
Entebbe. 
The provision of power through the public, centralized grid is so inefficient that private lions are forced to turn to the 
second-best solution of providing power in-house. All large investors surveyed had its own stand-by electric 
generator. The average cost of power production for these investors are much higher than in countries where it is 
efficiently supplied, but the cost is unevenly distributed, anti the unit Cost of power generated is mitch higher for the 
smaller investors. In fact, for some very small firms, the cost of inhouse power generation is prohibitive and their 
operations suffer accordingly. 
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capability. Ugandans who live andlor have funds abroad are able to make comparative 
assessments of the investment climate in Uganda and overseas. Unless pure sentiment drives their 
economic decisions, skilled Ugandans or their capital will not return in numbers unless 
government implement the kinds of measures that makes the investment climate attractive for all 
investors, including foreign investors. The return of flight capita] would be fostered, for example, 
by permitting local banks to offer foreign currency-deposit facilities to nationals. 
P05 : Government must foster institutional building for private business 
activity 
Building a sound financial system, a fair legal system and well-equipped money and capital 
markets are very important. 
Financial institutions have not put in place specific credit schemes to address the financial 
requirements of investors. Most commercial banks have funds for short-term lending which is 
beneficial for traders and businesses which require funds for working capital. Moreover, the high 
interest rates charged by banks discourage investors from using borrowed capital. 
The passing of the 1991 investment code was meant to signal in clearer terms than those of the 
existing law that private individuals or companies are welcome to invest in Uganda, to provide 
them with assurance about their treatment and to indicate the current priorities of the government 
with respect to investment issues. However, this is not sLifficient. What is required is an overall 
legal infrastructure for private business activity - for local and foreign investors alike — consisting 
of laws providing for the formation of business activities, enforcement of contracts, private 
ownership and tranfer of property, technology and industrial property protection, the assessment 
and payment of taxes, foreign exchange dealings and so on. 
The provision of a strong framework of laws defining property rights, regulating the enforcement 
of contracts, assuring effective competition, establishing bankruptcy procedures, and building an 
independent judicial system for the fair and timely adjudication of claims. The establishment of 
Tax Appeals Court would provide a means of neutral arbitration and thus help alleviate the fear 
investors have developed under an unaccountable tax administration. 
Specific policies related to investment incentives 
Fiscal, financial and other incentives remain an important part of Uganda's investment promotion 
packages. While their effects on stimulating new investments are difficult to measure, they 
nevertheless represent important costs to the domestic economy. 
P06: Harmonize policies on investments by enlarging the membership of and 
empowering UIA to become a true 'one-stop shop' 
Government needs to harmonize and institutionalize the decision making process and relieve the 
over-dependency on the President or the Finance Minister. 
In this respect, IJIA should be made a true 'one-stop shop' and should include other relevant 
bodies like URA, National Bureau of Standards (NBS). National Environmental Management 
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Authority (NEMA), line ministries in a streamlined institutional decision-making body for 
investment approvals. 
Unless this is done, the new investment code concerning foreign investors can be contradicted 
or undermined by other existing laws, for example, tax regulations, labour laws, environmental 
protection, etc. Often, the implementation of the investment code is vested in the Uganda 
Investment Authority, while the implementation of other laws remains vested in the traditional 
ministries. The result is that the extent to which a foreign investor stays under the purview of the 
investment code and is 'excused' from otherwise applicable but conflicting legislation, largely 
depends on how powerful each individual agency or ministry is perceived to be in the national 
decision-making process of the day and whether the most powerful agencies are in favour of the 
proposed investment. 
As a result, many investors develop an impression that the arrangements for investments are less 
than transparent and that some form of extra effort' is required if projects are to he finalized. 
Where such efforts can be construed as illicit payments, many foreign investors would be deterred 
from investing so as not to transgress anti-corruption laws in their own countries. In US, for 
example, illicit payments are illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, passed in 1978, and 
companies can be fined up to $2 million for transgressing the Act. 
P07: Provision of after-investment services to established investors 
Government can benefit from a positive image given by investors already established in Uganda. 
They are the natural candidates to play a key role as a source of FDI for Uganda, including 
through reinvested earnings, and to provide positive demonstration effect for potential new 
investors. At the moment, they are, however, frequently those that have benefitted least from the 
new investment regimes. Incentives are often targeted only at new investors. Such policies need 
to be reviewed. In this respect, consideration should also be given to the provision of various 
after-investment services aimed at reducing the 'hassle costs of doing business' to established 
investors, analogous to the marketing concept of 'after-sales service'. 
P08: "Front-loaded" tax holidays be abolished altogether 
Tax holidays or reduced rates on taxable income are effective, of course, only when the 
investment yields substantial taxable profits. Moreover, the foreign investor in a newly 
developing country is less interested in receiving an exemption after a profit is made than he is 
in being sure of a profit in the first instance. Measures that enable a company to earn a profit are 
more encouraging than the granting of exemptions after a profit is made. 
The current over-generous, untargeted incentives represent unnecessarily lost revenue, distortions 
in the domestic economy and are not proven to be effective in attracting FDI. 
Kibikyo's (1996) survey of 32 firms benefitting from tax incentives in Uganda showed that tax 
incentives are ineffective and inefficient way of attracting FD124. Only 6 firms believed that the 
incentives are of some use, the rest think otherwise. See also other studies such as Dixson, 1967 
Bilierbeck and Yasugi, 1974; Anwar and Shariff, 1974; Bond, 1981. 
Moreover, the result of tax competition among developing countries is that all offer essentially 
the same package. Hence, the main impact of these incentive schemes is a loss in government 
revenues. 
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Besides the tax revenue foregone as a result of exemptions may afterall be taxed away by the 
investor's home country - that is, a transfer of tax revenue from Uganda to those countries as 
shown in Table 6.25 
Table 6: Overall effective tax rates (in percentages) for institutional investors 
Selected OECD countries 




Australia 11.8 27.0 33.9 
Canada 19.3 33.3 40.5 
France 8.2 24.2 36.7 
Germany 9.9 36.7 21.9 
Italy 14.8 41.9 30.6 
Japan 21.5 37.5 38.3 
UK 15.6 25.4 25.6 
USA 13.9 29.6 33.3 
OECD average 15.3 33.3 33.3 
Source: OECD database 
Moreover, among the sectors receiving incentives, services and trade which contribute much 
lower revenue than manufacturing has the greatest share. This has negative effect on the 
manufacturing sectors - competition over the markets with imported goods. 
Furthermore, a recent 1995 USAID report evaluating investment attraction programmes in 
developing countries concluded that tax exemptions have a negligible impact on investments 
targeting the domestic market but are essential for export-oriented FDI. These findings tend to 
explain the fact that virtually all the foreign investors operating in Uganda are targeting the 
domestic market and do not find the incentive scheme to be critical. 
We therefore recommend that tax exemptions should be abolished and instead replace them with 
a uniform but low tax rates. Lower uniform tax rates will also eliminate the arbitrary tax 
exemptions by UTA to different companies leading to favouritism and corruption in the scheme. 
P09: Consider promoting back-loaded' incentive system where only willing and 
successful investors are rewarded 
Sometimes obligations are imposed on investors concerning their operations after establishment 
of the business. Foreign investors may, for example, be reqttired to create and maintain a certain 
number and type of jobs or to achieve export targets. A common requirement concerns limitation 
on the employment of foreign managerial and technical personnel. Such requirements are often 
linked to the grant of incentives at the time of the investment approval. 
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X Concluding remarks 
Uganda has undertaken many efforts during the past few years to increase its attractiveness to 
investors and thus enhance its own growth prospects. These efforts have included, at the 
macroeconomic level, wide-reaching domestic economic policy reforms and, at the level of the 
FDI regulatory framework, the liberalization of existing frameworks or the adoption of new ones, 
creating investment vehicle (UTA), the simplification of administrative procedures applicable to 
foreign investors, the conclusion of bilateral investment protection and promotion treaties and 
accession to various multilateral treaties facilitating FDI flows. 
All these efforts have led to a recognizable improvement of investment conditions in Uganda, 
although more can and needs to be done to exploit the investment opportunities that exist in 
Uganda. in this respect government can do this, for instance by, 
Creating a climate favourable to investment which requires establishing a partnership 
between the government and the private sector on the basis of greater transparency in 
public administration and strong Intermediate organizations such as chambers of 
commerce, business councils, professionals and associations. that can engage the state in 
a regular dialogue. The state has a critical role to play; but government need to 
encourage, stimulate. regulate, and complement the private sector, rather than compete 
with it or attempt to displace, discourage, and exploit it. 
• Maintaining economic and political stability, as a general precondition for increased FDT, 
and to intensify regional cooperation. With greater regional integration, each individual 
country would have an increased market for particular goods. 
• Recognizing that Uganda's medium to long-term investment potential and its comparative 
advantage is not in its modest manufacturing sector but in food production, agro 
processing, tourism and power supplies. 
What we have to realize is that there is no pool of investors with Uganda in mind just waiting to 
be lured into the country. There is Eastern Europe, Asia. Latin America and other African 
countries also competing for the same investors. 
We also have to bear in mind that foreign investment cannot entirely be the engine of growth, and 
cannot be the solution to our country's shortfall in capital needed for investment. It will only 
contribute but other sources must also be tapped. It cannot substitute the need for domestic 
savings. Singapore, with the largest amount of FDI in Asia (as a percentage of total capital), also 
has one of the highest saving rates in the world. 
Overall, Uganda has done a remarkable job in attracting FDI given the obstacles of history, 
context and inherent impediments. A continued process of foreign investment liberalisation is 
thus necessary to realize the full potential of foreign investment and allow foreign investment to 
complement local effort in accelerating the country's development. The hope is a promising one 
as the restoration continues. 
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XI. Areas of further research 
One line of research can look at whether or not foreign firms have any 'spillovers' such as 
promoting technology transfers; improving productivity through joint ventureship with local 
counterparts; whether foreign firms push up wages for local workers; whether foreign firms act 
as export catalysts by helping domestic firms to break into export markets; etc. Furthermore, to 
assess the validity of the 'pollution haven hypothesis that is, that foreign investors flock to 
developing countries like Uganda to take advantage of lax environmental standards. 
Another line of research is the relationship between FDI and local private investment. How do 
different elements of the local business community feel about foreign investment? Does FDI act 
as a catalyst for the local private investment or is it the other way round? What are the linkages, 
if any, between FDI and local private investment and how do they work? 
These questions are important in the Ugandan case since the government tends to be more 
enthusiastic and attentive to foreign investors than to local investors. Answers to these questions 
can help government in formulating policies that will enhance the linkages between local and 
foreign firms. 
A third line of research can assess the effectiveness of the microeconomic policies specifically 
designed to promote private investment, both local and foreign. Alternative investment policies 
have different consequences that can be analysed in terms of an 'allocation effect', a 'distribution 
effect', and a 'balance of payments effect'. For example, Fry (1983) finds that policies designed 
to deliberately stimulate FDI may simply encourage round-trip capital flows from the host 
country thus reducing national savings. In a survey of the incentive systems in nine Asian 
countries. Chen (1994) finds that competition for FDJ through special incentive schemes may 
actually be more harmful than beneficial. For example. one study of Thailand shows that 70 
percent of all projects that received fiscal incentives such as tax holidays would have proceeded 
without the tax incentives. Moreover, the result of tax competition among these nine countries 
is that all offer essentially the same package. Hence, the main impact of these incentive schemes 
is a loss in government revenues. 
In a series of studies by the OECD, it was found that investment incentives play little role in 
determining whether or not to undertake the investment, or the timing and form of such an 
investment but did play a role in choosing the location of the investment. 
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Appendix A 
Table Al: FDI inflows, value and as percentage of GDP, by host country, 1981-1985. 1986-1990 and 1991-1993 
host country 
Value, millions of dollars Percentage of GDP 
1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993 
Africa 1697.2 282820 3005.30 0.53 089 0.89 
Leastdeveloped 
countries of Africa 
231.6 50750 665.70 0.36 0.71 0.95 
COte dlvoire 33.7 52.00 62.80 0.46 0.53 0.65 
Chad 12.6 11,30 2.80 1.99 1.17 0.22 
Liberia 2.8 238.70 9.30 1.90 20.56 0.78 
Namibia 3.3 7.00 75.80 0.20 0.37 3.10 
Botswana 49.8 60.90 39.90 4.52 2.77 1.05 
Ethpia I 0.10 120 -0.02 0.0 0.09 
Gambia -0.1 3.10 7.30 -0.03 1.14 2.32 
Ghana 8.5 8.80 20.50 0.20 0.16 0.31 
Nigeria 400.3 723.30 780.40 0.50 2.16 2.35 
Rwanda 15.0 15.90 3.90 1.05 0.72 0.25 
Bitrundi 3.3 1.20 0.70 0.32 0.11 0.06 
Sudan 5.9 -3.30 -0.20 0.7 0.03 0.00 
Uganda -0.4 -0.60 2.50 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 
Kenya 15.9 39.00 8.90 0.25 0.48 0.12 
Tanzania 8.7 -0.30 11.60 0.15 -0.01 0.44 
Zambia 19.2 11.50 97.20 0.59 36.5 2.99 
Malawi 8.6 14.40 7.90 0.72 1.01 0.39 
Zimbabwe 0.2 -12.70 15.30 - -0.2 0.26 




















Average for Africa 6.7 523.0 0.8 72.0 8.9 . 
Côte d'lvoire 9.6 698.3 -0.6 32.9 6.5 
Chad 1.3 199.2 1.2 46.2 2.2 
Liberia 1.2 4197 - 65.2 7.8 
Namibia 2.4 1,716.6 3.8 - . 31.0 
Bolswana 3.8 2,865.8 4.6 - 10.5 
Ethiopia 4.9 64.8 -1.1 19.7 0.9 
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Gambia 0.3 245.7 2.6 0.5 23.2 
Ghana 6.7 369.9 4.5 35.6 3.! 
Nigeria 33.2 331.8 4.1 95.7 23.5 
Rwanda 1.6 205.4 1.3 11.5 2.5 
Burundi 1.1 94.5 2.3 42.4 0.6 
Sudan 6.4 224.8 4.9 56.3 0.0 
Uganda 3.3 202.0 4.2 9.1 0.7 
Kenya 7.2 211.0 0.5 23.3 1.2 
Zambia 3.6 356.1 0.7 84.9 29.9 
.,,.,..: 107 11 .I — 
5.9 
1 
S -1.3 21.3 2.6 
Share of FD[ in gross domestic investment, by host country, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1993 Table A3: 
Country 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993 
Africa 2.33 3.50 4.50 
Least develo 
Africa 
ped countries of 2.48 4.47 5.78 
COtedivojie 2.3! 4.84 6.31 
Chad 23.95 10.64 2.28 
Liberia 10.89 220.62 9.41 
Namibia 1.98 2.50 27.69 
Botswana 16.07 10.60 2,98 
Ethipia 
' 
0.17 0.05 0.78 
Gambia -0.15 72.29 12.19 
Ghana 2.42 1.43 2.31 
Nigeria 3.64 23.73 19.89 
Rwanda 6.67 4.93 1.58 
Burundi 1.97 0.68 0.33 
StLdan 5.1 -0.25 -0.02 
Uganda -0.19 -0.18 0.80 
Kenya 10.6 2.42 0.71 
Tanzania 2.54 -0.08 2.55 
Zambia 3.59 39.14 30.97 
Malawi 3.4 6.78 2.67 
Zimbabwe 0.02 -1.22 1.19 
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Table 4A: Eiternal financial flows related to EDI, by host country, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1993 (Annual averages, 
millions of doUars) 
Country 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993 
Africa 
A FDI inflows 
B. Profitremittance 
C. Net transfers 
Least developed countries of Africa 
A. FDI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 




















A. FDI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 











A. F1)I inflows 
B. Profit remittances 









A FBI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 











A FDI inflows 
B. Profit I'cmittanccs 












B. Profit remittances 











A FBI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 











A FBI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 











A FBI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 











A FDI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 











A FDI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 











A FBI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 











Country 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993 
iaIawi 
AFDlinflosvs 
B. Profit remittances 











A FDI inflows 
B. Profit remittances 










Sources : UNCTA D Division on Transnutional Corporations and investment, based on 
International Monetary Fund: estimates of the Organization/br Economic Cooperation and 
Development: national sources, and UNCTAD databank. 
Notes : Least developed countries of Africa include: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djihouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Gu tea, Guii-tea-Bissau, Lesotiiu, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauriiania, 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C2 : Country of origin of investor 
Appendix C 
Frequency Percent 
Africa 29 47.5 
Britain 14 23.0 
Other european country 5 8.2 
Other countries 3 4.9 
Not applicable 10 16.4 
Total 61 100.0 
Table C3: Point of first contact 
Frequency Percent 
Local business people 5 8.0 
Foreign investors in Uganda 2 3.4 
Well establiséd persons 7 11.5 
Presidential mission abroad 5 8.0 
UJA 7 11.5 
Not applicable 35 57.4 
Total 61 100.0 
Table C4: Do you benefit from any UIA incentives? 
Frequency Percent 
Yes 54 88.5 
No 7 11.5 
Total 61 100.0 
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Total 61 100.0 











Total 61 100.0 
Table C7: What do think of future economic outlook? 
Frequency Percent 
Development 53 86.8 
Decline 6 9.9 
Uncertain 2 3.3 
Total 61 100.0 





Customs department 8.2 
UEB 10 16.4 
UPTC 6 9.8 
Ministry of trade an 2 3.3 
Ministry of lands 2 3.3 
non response 2 3.3 
Total 61 100 
-49- 
Table C9: Main motivating factor for comm to invest in Uganda 
Enabling environment, that is, generally 
favourable economic conditions and political 
climate 
RANK 
25 41.0 1 
Availability of specific resources 6 9.8 4 
Promotion/incentives offered by the Uganda 
government 
10 16.4 2 
Promotion/incentives offered by the home country 1 1.6 8 
Previous trad relations with Uganda 7 11.5 3 
Long established personal/family relations 3 4.9 6 
Favourable information from press/other investors 2 3.2 7 
My competitors made similar move first 0 0.0 9 
Cost of labour 4 6.6 5 
Size of market 4 
Table ClO: Most important incentive 
MOST iMPORTANT INCENTIVE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Duty exemption/rebate on plant, machinery and 
construction materials 
19 31.1 1 
Duty exemption/rebate on industrial inputs 11 18.0 2 
Tariff protection 7 11.5 3 
Corporate tax holidays 19 31.1 1 
Ease of remittances of dividends and profits 4 6.6 4 
Privileged access to local credit 1 1.6 5 
Table Cli: Main sector of activity 
SECTOR 







Fishing 2 3.3 4 
Manufacturing 42 68.9 1 
Construction 2 3.3 4 
Trade and restaurants 8 13. 
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Table C12: Main factor considered in making investment decisions 
MAIN FACTOR CONSIDERED FREQUENCY PERCENT RANK 
Profitability in the sector of operation 35 57.4 1 
Incentives packages offered by government 
13 21.3 3 
Access and reliability to basic utilities, 
e.g. water, electricity, phones, etc. 9 14.8 4 
Local contribution to the project 6 9.8 4 
Intellectual property protection 4 6.6 5 
Returns to your investments 13 21.3 3 
Ease of remittance of dividends and profits 4 6.6 5 
Cheap iaboui 1 1.6 6 
Political stability and enabling economic 
environment 
14 23.0 2 
Table C13: Main contribution of your investment to Uganda 
MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Taxes/fees paid to the treasury 23 37.7 1 
Providing employment to Ugandans 16 26.2 2 
Net increase in investment 
(Capital formation) 
6 9.8 4 
Net increase in exports 
(foreign currency savings) 
2 3.3 6 
Import substitution ability 
(foreign currency savings) 
10 16.4 3 
Transfer of new technology 
and managerial skills 
4 6.6 5 
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Table C14: Main problems in operating business 
PROBLEM FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Problems with basic infrastructure 
e.g. water,e!ectricity, telephone. etc. 
13 21.3 1 
Availability and/or cost 
of raw materials and other inputs 
8 13.1 3 
Problems with financing 9 14.8 2 
Problems with distribution 
network(transport) 
5 8.2 6 
Restrictive government regulations 4 6.6 6 
Cost and/or quality of labour 3 4.9 7 
Market conditions (level of demand, competition) 5 8.2 5 
Problems to get land/industrial space 3 4.9 7 
Taxes on raw materials finished products 2 3.3 9 
Competition from imported similar products 6 9.8 4 
intellectual property protection is too weak 3 4.9 8 
Table Cl5: Main problem relating to recruitment/management of labour 
LABOUR RECRUITMENT 
MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Lack of middle management/technicians 19 31.1 2 
Lack of skilled labour 13 21.3 3 
High wage demand coupled with poor 
work culture leading to low productivity 
21 34.4 1 
Can't lay off or fire workers 3 4.9 4 
Trade union restrictions 2 3.3 5 
Regulations governing expatriate personnel 3 4.9 4 
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Table C16: Main recent investment initiative 
MAIN RECENT iNVESTMENT INITIATIVE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Launch of new activity/product 22 36.1 1 
Expansion of existing operations 17 27.9 2 
Improvement of the effectiveness 
of existing operations 
15 24.6 3 
Simple replacement of existing 
equipment with minor improvements 
7 11.5 4 
Table C17: Sources of finances 
SOURCES OF FINANCING FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
2 New equity from foreign parent company 12 19.7 
New equity from Ugandan private/public company 7 11.5 3 
Loan from foreign parent company 12 19.7 2 
Loan fromUgandan banks 13 21.3 1 
Loan from foreign banks 7 11.5 3 
Supplier credit 5 8.2 4 
Others 5 8.2 4 
Table C18: Main problem in securing raw materials/inputs 
IF YES, MAIN PROBLEMS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Poorquality 11 18.0 3 
Prices are not competitive 9 14.8 4 
Supply is not reliable 18 29.5 1 
Local suppliers are too few or non existent 15 24.6 2 
others 8 13.1 5 
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Table C19: Perception of sources of non-commercial risks 
PERCEPTiON OF SOURCES OF NON - 
COMMERCIAL RISKS 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Expropriation 3 4.9 5 
War or civil disturbance 11 18.0 2 
Unpredictable political climate 4 6.6 4 
Failure to respect contractual 
obligations by government 
10 16.4 3 
Reversal of policies/incentives 33 54.1 1 
granted by government 
Table C20 Main future plan of operation 
FUTURE PLAN OF OPERATIONS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Maintain operation at current level 5 8.2 5 
Expand operation 44 72.1 1 
Introduce a new product 18 29.5 2 
Invest in new equipment 15 24.6 3 
Improve workers' technical training 15 24.6 3 
Improve management skills 9 14.8 4 
Table C21: main problem in dealing with government agencies 
PROBLEM iN DEALING WITH 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Failure to respect contractual 
obligations 
5 8.2 5 
Legislative insecurity, including 
increases in taxation after a project 
has been implemented 
18 29.5 2 
Corruption resulting from red tape 
and a multitude of authorizations 
required to do business 
26 42.6 1 
Excessive legalism and lack 
of precision in legal texts 
3 4.9 6 
slow and arbitrary decision taking 18 29.5 2 
incompetent/rude officials 14 23.0 4 
Others 2 3.3 6 
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Table C22: Main problem related to government regulations 
PROBLEM RELATED TO GOVERNMENT 
REGULATIONS 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE RANK 
Import and export regulations 16 26.2 2 
Tax related regulations 27 44.3 1 
Licensing requirements and processing 2 3.3 5 
Restrictions on employment of 
expatriate staff 
6 9.8 3 
Requirements to use local inputs o poor quality 3 4.9 4 
ownership of land 6 9.8 3 
The proportion of ownership open to foreign firms 1 1.6 6 















MANAGEMENT 30 45 10 39 40 84 
TECHNICAL 23 31 6 52 29 83 
UNSKILLED 42 152 3 6 45 158 
TOTAL 95 128 23 87 211 325 
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